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Standard

DECEMBER 27, 2004

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HOLLAND DAZE

The Dutch rethink multiculturalism

BY CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL



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A Bow to Fiscal Conservatism

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As the curtain rises on his second term, President Bush doesn't lack for opportunities to secure an enduring legacy.

In addition to prosecuting the war on terrorism, the president has indicated that he wants to reform Social Security, simplify the nation's tax code, and institute health savings accounts—all noble yet formidable challenges.

Here's one additional item for that legacy portfolio: a bow to fiscal conservatism by restoring presidential line-item veto authority.

In June 1998, only two years after a Republican Congress and a Democratic president agreed that line-item vetoing was a necessary means to curb Washington's spending appetite, the Supreme Court struck down the president's ability to remove individual projects from congressionally approved legislation. Instead, the president can sign or veto spending and tax bills only in their entirety.

Not surprisingly, Congress has taken full advantage of the situation. According to the budgetary watchdog Citizens Against Government Waste, Congress this past year approved more than 10,600 "pork" items totaling nearly \$23 billion—a 13 percent increase over the previous year—at a time when the federal deficit surpassed \$422 billion and the national debt topped \$7.5 trillion.

With Washington drowning in a sea of red ink, the timing is right to restore line-item authority. The only question is how to proceed.

Here are three options:

1. *Constitutional Amendment.* Separate bills currently before the House and Senate would restore line-item authority by amending the Constitution. Although the approval process is steeper (a two-thirds vote in both chambers of Congress, plus 38 states'

approval), it improves the chances of a new law surviving an all-but-certain constitutional challenge by line-item opponents.

2. *Impoundment.* Up to 1974, presidents enjoyed a power known as impoundment: if a president didn't think an appropriation was appropriate, he didn't spend the earmarked money. But amid Watergate and its various intragovernmental power struggles, Congress restricted impoundment. Three decades later, Congress should right that wrong and give the president the ability not to spend money allocated by Congress if that spending is deemed unnecessary.

3. *Enhanced Rescission.* The president does have one option: he can rescind "pork" items and send an entire spending bill back to Congress for reconsideration. However, Congress holds the trump card: if it doesn't act, the president's rescission is automatically rejected. A simple remedy for this would be "enhanced rescission" authority whereby Congress would be forced to vote on the president's request within forty-five to sixty days, thus forcing members to go on the record as for or against fiscal excess.

Will these reforms dramatically reverse the rising deficit tide? Probably not. In the eighteen months that he enjoyed line-item veto authority, President Clinton targeted only eighty-two programs, thirty-eight of which were restored by Congress for an overall savings of a mere \$2 billion—a drop in the federal bucket.

Nevertheless, it would send a positive message to a cynical public: if Washington can't halt runaway spending, at least it is willing to hand over the reins to the president and let him try to slow down the horses.

—Bill Whalen

Bill Whalen is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

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Amos v. Andy

Needing a Halloween party costume in 1983, Louisiana district judge Timothy Ellender borrowed an orange jumpsuit and a pair of handcuffs from the local parish sheriff, and—accompanied by his wife, wearing a police officer's uniform—went dressed as a prison inmate. It was supposed to be a bit of harmless self-deprecation, an apologetic Ellender has ever since insisted. And the Louisiana Supreme Court has now decided to take him at his word on that. “In choosing these costumes,” a 5-2 majority of the court determined last week, it was Ellender’s intent “to be humorous by implying that Mrs. Ellender, who was newly married to him and who was reportedly young and attractive, had her husband under her control.” Nothing in the nature of an “affront to the African-American community” was contemplated.

Get the joke?

Maybe this will help: Ellender’s Halloween costume also featured a fake afro—what his lawyer later called a “black clown wig,” designed to top off the otherwise typical uniform of your average “white convict.” Only for some reason this particular “white convict” had a really dark, shoe polish-like substance smeared all over his face. Here, again, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s Decem-

ber 13 ruling: “When Judge and Mrs. Ellender arrived at the party, their costumes did not generate the laughs they had expected. Judge Ellender remarked upon this, and Mr. Martin”—the judge’s brother-in-law and host, who just happened to be dressed as Buckwheat at the time—“offered the judge some black makeup to enhance his costume.” After all, as Ellender observed during testimony before the Louisiana Judiciary Commission in June of this year, “coloration” helps “accentuate the humorous nature” of a comic wardrobe. Blue would’ve worked fine, too.

Now you get the joke? *Gosh, a racial caricature? That never occurred to him.*

Oddly enough, the Louisiana Judiciary Commission wasn’t buying this explanation. Four months ago the commission charged Ellender with having trick-or-treated in “a racially stereotypical manner that perpetuated the notion of African-Americans as both inferior and as criminals.” Because Ellender had thus violated various canons of judicial conduct, raised questions about his ability to deal fairly with black defendants, and cast the Louisiana courts in an unflattering light, the commission recommended that the state supreme court suspend him from the bench for a year without pay.

Odder still, Louisiana’s top jurists

last week: (1) adopted a radically different interpretation of Judge Ellender’s behavior, “accepting his statements” concerning the Halloween stunt’s innocent motives “as true”; and (2) basically went ahead with the suspension and salary-forfeiture punishment anyway. “We agree” that Ellender meant no harm, the Supreme Court’s majority acknowledged. Still, the justices are “greatly troubled” by the incident’s attendant bad publicity and think Ellender deserves the “discipline” of a minimum half-year ban from active duty. Moreover, the full, 12-month suspension may yet be imposed, the court warns Ellender, should he fail to “enroll in a course at one of the local universities which will allow him to gain insight into the attitude of other racial groups.” There are “several sociology departments” in the area whose offerings fit this bill, the majority opinion advises, “including but not limited to Nicholls State.”

Historical note: Nicholls State University is named for Francis R.T. Nicholls, white “redeemer” governor of Louisiana following Reconstruction, and later chief justice of the state supreme court whose notorious 1892 segregated-railcars ruling was eventually upheld in *Plessy v. Ferguson*.

Maybe that’s the joke? ♦

Knockers v. Knockoffs

Also making legal news December 13: A federal court in Orlando struggles with the question whether certain employers might be entitled to a form of trademark protection for their employees’ really, really big breasts.

“The Court must begin its discussion” of this issue, writes U.S. District Judge Anne C. Conway, “with the Hooters Girl.” And the court must therefore immediately dive deep into the meta-

physics of Hooterness, apparently. “As the Plaintiffs themselves have said,” Conway observes, “‘The Hooters Girls are Hooters. . . . In other words, without the Hooters Girl, there would be no Hooters.’”

It’s simple, really: Hooters, the “sports bar” network, has sued WingHouse, a competing chain of establishments, for allegedly ripping off the distinctive look and feel—or “trade dress”—of the plaintiff franchise’s restaurants. It’s shameless, complains Hooters.

WingHouse has copied the “rough-hewn rustic interior woodwork, including light colored wooden walls and floors.” WingHouse has copied the “table-top setup consisting of a wooden vertical paper towel spool, wood-weave platewear, and table tents.” WingHouse has even copied the “road signs displaying clever sayings.”

And oh, by the way, WingHouse has also hired waitresses of the top-heavy variety—a gambit that threatens to seriously encroach upon that part of the



Hooters customer base whose loyalty can't be secured by vertical paper towel spools alone. Hooters seeks relief from this plague of mammary clones.

But Judge Conway says no, not so fast. "The Court . . . concludes, as a matter of law, that the WingHouse Girl, with her black tank top and black running shorts, is not a 'knockoff' of the Hooters Girl," who sports a "white tank top" and "orange nylon running shorts," thank you very much. Besides which, who does the Hooters Girl think she is? Her "predominant function is to provide vicarious sexual recreation, to titillate, entice, and arouse male customers' fantasies." In short, she is "pri-

marily functional" and "this essential functionality disqualifies the Hooters Girl from trade dress protection."

Oh, oh. Cat fight. ♦

Rabkin v. SCRAPBOOK

An item in this space two weeks back has brought us an indignant letter from reader Rhoda Rabkin of Ithaca, New York, who finds it beyond belief that an "estimated 5,000 Canadians (plus Bob Dylan)" really did turn out "in below-freezing weather to jeer President Bush during his state visit to Ottawa" on November 30. Be those 5,000 Canadians as they may, the Bob

Dylan Mrs. Rabkin knows and loves would never have joined their jeering. "More likely," she suggests, "some careless writer has confused a great American songwriter with Dylan Penner, a Toronto-based organizer of the anti-Bush protests."

Actually, THE SCRAPBOOK has never heard of this Dylan Penner fellow. What happened was that we read a pro-American Canadian blogger's account of anti-Bush "hooligans" in Ottawa, among whom, said he, were "more New Yorkers than Canadians, and Bob Dylan." Searching the web for confirmation of this Dylan spotting, we found—on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's site—Ottawa reporter Paddy Moore's hour-by-hour diary of that day's protests. One entry reads as follows: "10:31 A.M.—Bob Dylan plays on [Parliament] Hill as Air Force One lands at Ottawa's airport."

In retrospect, Moore probably meant only to suggest that a Dylan *recording* was playing on the p.a. system, and that pro-American blogger—along with our own "careless writer"—misinterpreted him. If so, THE SCRAPBOOK humbly apologizes both to Mrs. Rabkin and Mr. Dylan for the mixed-up confusion. ♦

Martin v. Reality

Speaking of mixed-up confusion and Canadians, there was the following nugget buried in the 21st paragraph of a Dec. 16 *Washington Post* story on the latest Pentagon antiballistic missile test:

Prime Minister Paul Martin said in television interviews Tuesday night that his country will participate in a U.S. missile defense system only if it does not have to contribute money, no missiles are based in Canada, and Canada has a say in how the system is run.

Martin, the *Post* observes, has thus "spelled out a strong Canadian position." ♦

Casual

CUT TO COMMERCIAL

Gore (not Al, the bloody stuff) is all the rage on television these days, especially in crime shows and medical dramas. After watching a camera shot dwell fondly on a diseased or mutilated body, the viewer gets to tag along into the operating room or, if he's really lucky, the medical examiner's office for a full open-chest autopsy.

This gave me an idea for an invention. I call it the Gruesome Grissom Angioplasticam. Named after the main character on *CSI*, the highly successful forensic drama most responsible for making gore fashionable, the GGA camera will take television viewers inside the 6-millimeter-diameter, plaque-ridden arteries of stroke victims. It's for a new drama about one of the great serial killers of all time: heart disease. Okay, it's not a real invention, but the Gruesome Grissom joke works (if I may presume) with just about any body part or medication, yup, from ears to enemas.

My old fave *Law and Order* never used to reveal the bludgeoned condition of murder victims. Now it routinely provides the viewer a lingering camera shot of the point where the deadly bullet tore skin and shattered cranium before plowing into brain matter and exiting the frontal lobe.

I've begun to feel like Nurse Betty in that unwatchable Neil LaBute movie. After witnessing the particularly gruesome murder of her husband, Betty starts to believe she's a character in her favorite soap opera. In my own trance, I'm still me, but the only television I can enjoy are car commercials that happen to be the picture of wholesomeness.

- Woman takes a new Volkswagen for a test drive. Salesman touts the car's acceleration. On a two-lane

highway, they pass a slow brown car, which turns out to belong to a cop, who looks at the passing salesman as if he'd gladly throttle the presumptuous twirp. Cute, efficient, humorous.

- Married man and woman compete maniacally to get out of bed first so as to be the one to take their new car for the day. The husband wins. Next morning the wife does, having tinkered with her husband's alarm clock. Next the wife wakes up



believing she's got her husband beat again, only to realize the lump next to her in bed is a dummy—and her husband's long gone with the new car.

Oh man, they don't make TV like that anymore.

Actually, I'm being serious. Commercials are getting better all the time, even as the rest of television gets worse. At least the gore-filled medical and cop shows try to be smart. The same cannot be said of sitcoms.

In a just world, shows like *According to Jim* and *Still Standing* would be reduced to begging for an audience in 30-second, sell-or-die segments—and the recent Volkswagen campaign would be treated to a homage marathon in prime time, with elbow-patch commentators smoothing the transitions with behind-the-scenes anecdotes and interviews with the writers and directors.

I really do want to know more about these little gems of the small screen. If only there were a website, something like Ain't It Cool News, devoted to TV ads.

Then maybe I could find out the story behind Suze Orman's becoming a pitchman for G.M. SUVs, even as the financial writer counsels readers in her recent book, *The Laws of Money*, to think twice before buying new cars and taking on unsupportable debt. Or the story behind the Campbell's Soup campaign starring Gordon Elliott that began in the fall of 2003.

Elliott is a professional foodie with his own cable show. After he did a special on the mushrooms of Champigny, France, I spent a vacation in the Loire Valley and searched for one of the cave restaurants he'd visited, for a taste of the "four-et" sandwiches he'd featured, made with just-baked, clay-oven, pita-like bread and a variety of local mushrooms lightly grilled.

Elliott's great at finding far-flung culinary treats like this. But apparently he's also at home cashing checks, in exchange for telling people to eat the over-salted, gelatinous, canned starch-goop Campbell's continues to call soup.

The truth is, whether or not a commercial is particularly polished—and whether or not it involves any especially crass hypocrisy—I'm likely to watch it with a level of concentration that is simply weird.

"Passive" doesn't come close to the state of slack-jawed wonder I enter when almost any commercial comes on the idiot box. I am completely unable to do anything else at the same time. Most TV viewers prefer to chat during commercials and remain silent otherwise. I am just the opposite.

There must be something wrong with me. Maybe on a future episode of *CSI* I'll get to see which section of the brain's gray matter regulates the attention span. Only it will have been blown to smithereens.

DAVID SKINNER

Correspondence

A GRATEFUL MARINE

WE RECENTLY RECEIVED the copies of THE WEEKLY STANDARD that have my cardboard postcard printed in it. What a thrill. Thanks for doing that. All of my Marines loved seeing it. One of them even said, "Hey, I remember sending that one out."

I also had a chance to read Michael Goldfarb's CASUAL ("Lock and Load," Dec. 6) on video games and enjoyed it. I read it by the light of my flashlight, since the other officers in my room were all trying to sleep.

Thanks again! Semper Fi.

1ST LT. JAMES CRABTREE
Iraq

"ANONYMOUS" RESPONDS

THOMAS JOSCELYN takes issue with my writings on Iraq's al Qaeda ties ("Now You Don't Tell Us," Nov. 29). It's true that in my first book, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*, I discussed what I concluded was a connection between Iraq and al Qaeda.

Quite simply, I was wrong on that score. The book was based exclusively on open-source information, and I used that unclassified material to support my arguments. Prior to the 2003 Iraq war, I was assigned the task of reviewing a decade's worth of CIA holdings on the issue. Having reviewed more than 19,000 documents, the agency found nothing resembling a "relationship" between Iraq and al Qaeda. The best information available to the U.S. intelligence community showed no Saddam-al Qaeda connection. It likewise showed that the analysis on Iraq and al Qaeda in my first book was incorrect. I hope to correct that mistake if the book is ever reissued in a revised edition.

MICHAEL F. SCHEUER
Falls Church, VA

CROUCH ON CULTURE

ONE WOULD NOT BE surprised to find that I take exception to Harry Siegel's review of my new book, *The Artificial White Man* ("Artificial Culture," Nov. 15). What I find most bothersome is

the fact that Siegel seems to have not really read the book, since he claims that "too often" I became "unhinged" and used language more appropriate for a gangster rapper.

Beyond the three essays Siegel's review makes clear that he did read, is this frequently unhinged quality evident in the ones about John Singleton, Michael Jackson, Jorge Luis Borges, and Alfred Appel Jr.? Is it true of the summing up essay, "Blues to Go," which proves Davy Crockett a forerunner of gangster rappers; addresses the problem of acceptance and rejection among minority and women writers when faced with bigotry in literary giants; and says new things about the fiction of both F. Scott Fitzgerald and Ralph Ellison? I



think not, though I fiercely plead guilty to now and again bringing together intellectual language with that of the street when I want to carry home a point with a sidewalk jolt or a concrete snatch of humor.

Perhaps that justifies Siegel's accusing me of being a "hack" while offering no proof. Uh-oh. Now that I've played my blues, I think it's time to go.

STANLEY CROUCH
New York, NY

THE LITERAL TRUTH

I READ WITH PLEASURE Stephen F. Hayes's lament on the widespread and

seemingly unstoppable misuse of the word "literally" ("Literally Exasperated," Dec. 13). It raised in my mind another abuse of language, pertaining to the word "incredible." Like a cancer, this word is infecting our discourse in a way that is destroying our ability to distinguish between the merely amazing and the (if you'll pardon the expression) literally unbelievable.

I made this mistake years ago in a conversation with a friend from Holland. I declared her account of an especially remarkable (though by no means impossible) chain of events to be "incredible." She fired back, "No it's not!" (Leave it to a nonnative English speaker to teach us how to use our own language.)

As a philosophy professor, I'm especially concerned about the prospect of losing our ability to make distinctions. I will continue to correct my incredulous students in this regard, in what may well turn out to be a losing battle to preserve our rich vocabulary for expressing astonishment that falls short of incredulity.

CHRIS STEWART
Houghton, NY

I THINK STEPHEN F. HAYES should consider what has become acceptable usage of the adverb "hopefully." In which case he should accept reality and "literally" throw in the towel. Having done so, Hayes can hopefully overlook other journalists' grammatical peccadilloes.

ED WELLS
Eau Claire, WI

INTOLERANCE CHIC

IN READING Paul Marshall's "Fundamentalists & Other Fun People" (Nov. 22), I was most struck by the tone of various writers and columnists in describing the "religious right." They seem to be guilty of the same kind of ignorant intolerance of which they accuse so many Bush voters.

I think all of these people would do well to spare an hour or two on a Sunday, tear themselves away from the *New York Times*, and actually go to a Catholic mass or any type of Protestant service, especially one in a "red" county. The Gary Willses and Maureen Dowds of the

Correspondence

world might actually learn something. That would require them, however, to keep an open mind.

RICHARD DiNARDO
Stafford, VA

BACK TO SCHOOL

TOM WOLFE may understand “the social meaning of clothes, cars, glasses, words—even the way that people sit and stand” better than any other contemporary novelist, as Joseph Bottum writes (“School Days,” Nov. 22). But Wolfe doesn’t seem to know that Ivy League schools do not field basketball teams with only one Caucasian star (Jojo in the novel).

Maybe Wolfe thinks that Duke is an Ivy League school.

JEROME S. SHIPMAN
Potomac, MD

HATCH-ET JOB

STEPHEN F. HAYES’S “Porter’s House” (Nov. 29) failed to mention an important point. The Hatch Act for Federal Employees makes it illegal for CIA employees to engage in partisan activities, and expressly states that they may not use official authority or influence to interfere with an election.

Rather than merely being forced to resign, I suggest that some of these former CIA employees were removed from their positions in accordance with the Hatch Act’s penalties.

JEAN PALMER
Baltimore, MD

CALIFORNIA’S EMERGENCY

WESLEY J. SMITH laments that Californians passed Prop. 71 but rejected Prop. 67, “an initiative that would have added a modest tax to phone bills to keep the state’s endangered emergency rooms and trauma centers from shutting down” (“Suckers for ‘Science,’” Nov. 15).

California’s emergency rooms are shutting down because they are overwhelmed with nonpaying illegal immigrants who treat these facilities as drop-in

clinics. Prop. 67 could have been more accurately described as “a small phone tax to continue providing free medical care to illegal immigrants.”

This situation isn’t likely to be remedied until the whole ridiculous system collapses. So I voted against Prop. 67 to hasten its collapse—and thus, I hope, its repair.

BRENT WHITE
San Jose, CA

WHO DUBBED DEWEY?

IN YOUR NOV. 15 ISSUE, David Gelernter wrote that “Walter Winchell (or someone) is supposed to have called [Thomas] Dewey ‘the little man on top of the wedding cake’” (“Truman Beats Dewey! Again!”). In your Nov. 29 issue, letter-writer Nicky Billou responded: “Actually, it was Alice Roosevelt Longworth . . .”

I, too, had thought that this cruel description of Thomas Dewey came from Mrs. Longworth, until I consulted *Safire’s New Political Dictionary*. The waters become very muddy. In addition to Walter Winchell, Harold Ickes, and Clare Booth Luce, the phrase is attributed to Ethel Barrymore (by Mrs. Longworth) and (again by Mrs. Longworth) to Grace Hodgson Flandrau.

Mrs. Longworth is quoted as saying: “I did not coin the phrase . . . though I admit that I gave it currency.” Indeed she did. But the authorship of that nifty phrase is still in doubt—unless Mr. Safire has an update on the matter.

GEORGE MURRAY
Ossining, NY

CATHOLIC VOTERS

JOSEPH BOTTUM was completely off-base in his far too robust generalization that there is no such thing as “the Catholic vote” (“The Myth of the Catholic Voter,” Nov. 1 / Nov. 8). As a political scientist whose central concern is the Catholic voter, I wish to remedy this logical mistake.

In order to evaluate whether there is or is not a “Catholic vote,” we must know who the Catholic voter is. The logical problem is thus: Is the Catholic voter a

voter who happens to be Catholic, or a Catholic who happens to be a voter? This is a clear syntactical issue. I propose that the latter is really what we are looking for. If we consider those persons who are Catholic—that is, those who accept the Catholic worldview as enunciated by the Catechism and Church teaching—it does seem that there is a unique psychology and, in that sense, a Catholic vote. Contrary to first-response intuition, these persons are not reflexive partisans or abortion-only voters. They are truly independent in their outlook and use their faith and intellect to evaluate the political landscape.

We must divorce ourselves from the notion that the former definition I provided for the Catholic voter—the voter who happens to be Catholic—is valid. This sort of voter will confound and complicate our understanding of Catholic voting, for this voter does not evaluate politics through his Catholic lens. Rather, his Catholicity is a mere sideshow.

If Joseph Bottum recognized this, then he would most certainly have restricted his generalization to a subset of those who call themselves Catholic.

ADAM RAMEY
Rochester, NY

ERRATA

IN Joseph Epstein’s “A Lad of the World” (Dec. 6), the real-life murdered family depicted in Truman Capote’s *In Cold Blood* was misidentified as the “Cutter family.” The family’s name was actually Clutter.

• • •

THE WEEKLY STANDARD

welcomes letters to the editor.

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Merry Christmas

The mayor of Somerville, Massachusetts, is sorry. Really sorry. He recently called the city's annual December celebration a "Christmas party." And we can't be having that. What he meant to say, he explained, is "holiday party," because the word "Christmas" contains . . . um, a word they don't use in Somerville, Massachusetts.

But wait a minute. Doesn't "holiday" also contain a reference to that which dare not speak its name? The city marketing director of Wichita, Kansas, noticed. She led a task force that decided to call their annual Winterfest installation a "community tree"—since otherwise Wichita's etymologically astute citizens might hear the "holy day" in "holiday" and tremble for their children's safety.

In fact, what are we doing with trees at all? A few years ago, the city manager of Eugene, Oregon, banned decorated trees on public property during the month of December. And rightly so. Even a secularized symbol for Christmas is still somehow implicated in it all, a co-conspirator in the attempt to turn America into a theocracy. You can't finally eradicate the religious suggestion lurking in the pines, just as you can't wring every last drop of St. Nicholas out of Santa Claus. And if we allow a tree with ornaments on public land, the next thing you know people will be calling out, "God bless us, every one!" and "Peace on earth, goodwill to men!" And then, of course, the Inquisition.

Officials in Plano, Texas, were merely following this logic to its natural conclusion this year when they prohibited students from bringing even red and green napkins to school around Christmas. Or rather, the holidays. Or rather, that time of year when certain thoughtless students might be tempted to use red and green napkins, in contravention of the Plano Independent School District's pronouncements on table-linen sensitivity.

Such "attempts to de-Christianize Christmas are as

absurd as they are relentless," WEEKLY STANDARD contributing editor Charles Krauthammer wrote last week in the *Washington Post*. And does no one notice how antiquated these attempts seem? How 1970s it all feels: disco shirts, and platform shoes, and the flurry of Christmas lawsuits from the ACLU? When the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals declared unconstitutional the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, the decision felt not merely outrageous, but also curiously old-fashioned—dated and quaint, somehow, as though the superannuated judges couldn't see just how far a changed world had left them behind.

Since the November election, there has been much chatter among Democrats about the need to recapture some portion of America's religious vote. Hillary Clinton asked the left to use the Bible to help make its case. From her perch as House minority leader, Nancy Pelosi called on her fellow Democrats to be less publicly embarrassed about their private faith. Even while commentator after commentator fulminated in the liberal press about the victory of theoc-

racy in the national election, a parade of candidates hoping to chair the Democratic party has passed through Washington, all insisting they know how to resanctify their party—which has grown ever more secularized and ever more defeated since the 1970s.

Well, here's an easy place for them to start. Mock the mayor of Somerville. Rebuke the marketing director of Wichita. Denounce the school-district officials in Plano. Let a little Christmas back into Christmas.

But perhaps the Democrats are incapable of this anymore. The professional antireligion litigators have become a machine that runs of itself, and the Democratic National Committee seems to have forgotten where the off-switch is. The attempt to scrub religious symbolism from the public square must "flatten political rhetoric and make it less moving and interesting," presidential

If we allow a tree with ornaments on public land, the next thing you know people will be calling out, "Peace on earth, goodwill to men!"

speechwriter Michael Gerson recently tried to explain to reporters. More, it will damage “one of the main sources of social justice in our history. Without an appeal to justice rooted in faith, there would be no abolition movement or civil rights movement or pro-life movement.” Occasional mentions of God in President Bush’s speeches are not “code words; they’re our culture,” Gerson said. “It’s not a code word when I put a reference to T.S. Eliot’s *Four Quartets*.”

Exactly twenty years ago, back in 1984, Richard John Neuhaus predicted much of our current situation in *The Naked Public Square*. Noting that millions of believers had come, through the 1970s, to feel “a powerful resentment against values that they believe have been imposed on them,” Neuhaus saw that the likes of Jerry Falwell had been called into existence by the radical secularists. America is an “incorrigibly religious” nation, he warned, and so it should stay, for “politics is most importantly a function of culture, and at the heart of culture is religion.” We strip the public square at our peril.

The Naked Public Square was one of the seminal books for the modern conservative movement. But it was also a deeply liberal book—at least as liberalism used to be understood. Expounding a tradition of liberal political thought about religion that runs from George Washington’s 1790 letter to the Jews of Newport, Rhode Island, through Tocqueville’s observations of the young republic, and down to Reinhold Niebuhr’s political theology, Neuhaus understood how the attempt to strip the public square derives, at last, from a disdain for the richness of life—a distaste for the democracy of difference, the clash and mingle of real human beings.

In the two decades since Neuhaus published his book, the Republicans have taken his advice to heart and found a way to speak again of God and faith in a liberal democracy. If the Democrats are serious about reclaiming the religious vote they began to abandon back in the 1970s, they might begin this holiday season by forcing themselves to say two simple words: Merry Christmas!

—Joseph Bottum, for the Editors



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The Army We Have

It's too small.

BY **FREDERICK W. KAGAN**

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Donald Rumsfeld declared, "You go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time." The callousness and irresponsible buck-passing of this statement need no further elucidation. Its deeper irony, however, requires a little spelling out.

Donald Rumsfeld has been secretary of defense for four years. He has been an extremely active SecDef, molding the military service agendas, including manpower and materiel policy, with almost unprecedented meticulousness. The American Army in Iraq is very much Rumsfeld's Army. Its relatively small size reflects his belief in the superiority of air power over ground forces. Its lack of armor reflects his conviction that "lightness" is a virtue. The hesitation to have it engage in rebuilding a shattered state reflects his understanding of war as an activity separate from politics and nation-building. The result: The military measures and manpower policies guiding the current deployment in Iraq do not sufficiently reflect the gravity of the security situation or the political stakes of ensuring a successful transition to democracy.

In the past several weeks, the Bush administration has taken two steps it should have taken six months ago: It destroyed insurgent safe havens in Falluja and elsewhere, and it announced an increase in troop strength to prepare for Iraqi

elections in January. U.S. policy will pay a price for the tardiness of these actions. Fallujans will go to the polls, if they feel safe enough, with the vision of American attacks and rebel resistance green in their memories. There may not be time for things to settle down in that war-torn city, a major center of Iraqi Sunnis, prior to the elections. Nor will the limited increase of American forces over the coming weeks have as much impact as would be desirable on the security situation in time for those elections.

The overall manpower situation of the American military, too, is grim. By increasing troop strength primarily by extending the tours of duty of American forces already in Iraq, and by steadfastly refusing to consider increasing the size of the Army in any meaningful way, the administration has committed itself to a risky policy. It effectively assumes that one of three things will happen after the Iraqi elections: (1) The violence and resistance to the establishment of secular democracy will suddenly and dramatically diminish; or (2) the American Army will be able to withstand indefinitely unprecedented strains and hardships; or (3) Iraq will somehow cease to be an American military problem once a democratically elected government has taken power in Baghdad. The first two possibilities are wishful thinking; the third is terrifying.

There is little reason to imagine that insurgent attacks will suddenly and dramatically cease with the election of a democratic Iraqi government. The insurgents are not fight-

ing simply to drive the United States out of Iraq, but to prevent the formation of precisely such a government. For some insurgents, in fact, only a government based on a radical interpretation of Islam can be legitimate. The period after the elections may well see attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces on a par with those we've seen in recent months.

It is quite possible that the insurgents will begin to shift their attacks away from U.S. forces and onto Iraqi forces and leaders, but Americans should take no solace from such a scenario. The nascent Iraqi state will not be able to defend itself for many months, perhaps years, after the election. Until then, it will be vulnerable to insurgents who can play on difficulties in the economy and on the inevitable hiccups that attend the formation of any new democracy. It is highly probable that if U.S. forces do not continue to defend democracy in Iraq, then democracy in Iraq will perish.

The consequences may well be disastrous should democracy fail in Iraq. When the United States invaded Iraq with the intention of establishing the first Arab democracy, it placed democracy itself on trial in the Middle East. Many in the region, and outside as well, declared that Arabs could not have democracy, or, more ominously, that democracy was inappropriate for Muslims. If the United States oversees the first real elections in a modern Arab land and then sits idly by as radical insurgents destroy the government, we will have set back the cause of democracy in the Middle East immeasurably. We will also have created excellent conditions for terrorists to reestablish bases and training camps in the heart of the Muslim world. The only way forward for America now is through success in Iraq.

It is likely, therefore, that a significant American military presence in Iraq will be necessary for some time. So the question becomes how much pain can the Army stand before breaking? There is no obvious

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answer, for America has never tried to sustain its armed forces for so long without dramatically increasing their number. And the armed forces have been holding up amazingly well. But, eventually, the toll of separation from families for more than a year at a time, of back-to-back rotations that make the separation even longer, and of seemingly endless duty at the front lines of a complicated and dangerous insurgency, will likely damage the Army's morale.

With no relief in sight and a force too small for the current mission, the probability that the Army will break under the pressure increases day by day. Rumsfeld's callous and flippant responses to serious questions raised by troops in Iraq could bring that day ever closer. If it arrives, skilled and experienced officers and senior NCOs will begin to leave the force. Recruiting for the active force will go down. The National Guard and Reserve will wilt under the strain. The result will be a serious erosion of American combat power at a critical time, and the consequences could last for decades.

This, however, is not the worst gamble that the Bush administration is taking. What if another contingency arises? What does this military inadequacy do to our bargaining positions with Iran and North Korea? How will the nation respond to Crisis X, wherever it may be?

It was apparent to some as long ago as the mid-1990s that the American Army was too small. The urgency of that problem has been clear to many since September 11. The time lost in increasing the Army to proper strength cannot be regained, but we can mitigate the dangerous consequences for an uncertain future if we start now. President Bush should use the election mandate he received to take the next bold step in the war for democracy and against terrorism. He should insist upon an immediate and dramatic increase in the size of our armed forces to allow them to carry out his wise determination to prevail in Iraq and in the war on terror.



Peter Steiner

Some question whether the necessary increase, perhaps 200,000 new troops or more, can be reached without a new draft. The historical evidence suggests it can. In 1985, the active Army numbered more than 780,000 men and women. As late as 1991, there were more than 750,000 soldiers. Today there are around 500,000 troops in the active Army. Even at the height of the Reagan economic boom and in the waning days of the Cold War, the volunteer force mustered more than 250,000 troops above the current level. The threat now is just as great and more imminent. If the president called upon the American people to show

their support not by flying yellow ribbons but by joining the Army, there is no reason to believe that they would not do so.

The best way to save the Army from collapse under strains too great to bear, the best way to prepare the nation for the long, hard struggles that lie ahead, is to return the Army to the size it maintained throughout the end of the last long, hard struggle. This task will take time, resources, skill, and determination. It will suffer from the time already lost. But the problems and dangers only increase when little is done to address this vital component of an effective strategy for fighting the war on terror. ♦

Ukraine Whole and Free

What I saw at the orange revolution.

BY ANDERS ÅSLUND

Donetsk, Ukraine
ON THE FIFTEENTH DAY of Ukraine's orange revolution, I arrived in Kiev. My car got stuck in a traffic jam caused by a demonstration at the parliament. I abandoned the car and joined the rally. The demonstrators' determination was stunning. The sea of people was perfectly orderly and calm. Two slogans predominated: "Yushchenko is our President" and "Do not stop our Freedom!" A third line ran "East and West together!"

This was a call for law and order, freedom, and national unity. Some groups marched under Ukrainian flags, some under the orange flags of opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko emblazoned with the name of their town or village. The demonstration didn't seem to have any class identity at all. Hardly any names of businesses, parties, or organizations were to be seen. No one talked about social or economic issues. This was pure politics. Ukraine's orange revolution is a classical liberal revolution, like 1848, or the Velvet Revolution in Prague in 1989. This rising against lawlessness and repression, for democracy and freedom, is a true bourgeois revolution.

Half in jest, people call it a revolt of the millionaires against the billionaires. Three of the revolutionary

leaders are very wealthy businessmen (Yulia Tymoshenko, Oleksandr Zinchenko, and Petro Poroshenko). They criticize not big business, but "bandits." The incumbent candi-



A supporter kisses a Yanukovich poster in Donetsk.

date, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, gets his key support from the three most prominent oligarchic groups, which between them reportedly put up \$300 million for his campaign. But overwhelmingly the Ukrainian business community supports the challenger, Yushchenko, in protest against the capture of the state by these three.

Ukraine's presidential election

also reflected a sharp regional divide. Yushchenko won big in 17 western and central districts. They are predominantly Ukrainian-speaking, though several are Russian-speaking. Yanukovich won equally massively in 10 Russian-speaking eastern and southern districts, scaring voters with the specter of western Ukrainian nationalism.

To get a better idea of what was going on, I traveled to Donetsk, Prime Minister Yanukovich's stronghold in the east, to talk to business leaders, especially some of the steel barons. I was impressed.

These self-made billionaires are as smart as they are dynamic. To them, politics is a means of advancing their business. They have bought up old Soviet steelworks and turned them around. One has opted for upstream vertical integration in raw materials (iron ore and coal), while another has concentrated on downstream purchases of steelworks in New Europe.

At present, they sell most of their steel to China and quite a lot to the Middle East, but they are painfully aware that the Chinese bonanza won't last long. Then they will have to sell more to Europe, which protects itself against Ukrainian steel. In order to break down that barrier, they want to buy downstream companies in Europe, have Ukraine join the World Trade Organization, and develop a free trade agreement with Europe.

I asked them about their business interests in Russia. Nobody seemed to own any significant assets there. Nor do they have any real Russian partners, though they sell a bit to their big neighbor. Energy they acquire on a free market, whereas the Russian steel companies are their severest competitors. However geographically close they are to Russia, the Donetsk steel barons long for Europe.

One had been a major supporter of Yanukovich. Another had maintained his neutrality, but appeared to prefer

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AFP/ Alexander Nemenov

Yanukovich's hometown of Yenakievo: a monument to a Soviet steelmaker, with a steel plant in the background

Yushchenko as a way of leveling the playing field with his bigger competitor. Not even big businessmen dare speak their minds in the authoritarian eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Lugansk. My interlocutors spoke with great respect of Yushchenko, who has carefully avoided insulting the east. Now all they want from the election is a clear result—contrary to President Leonid Kuchma, who appears to be working for a prolonged political crisis, which would destabilize the Ukrainian economy and thus hurt the opposition.

But what about the calls for separatism coming from some eastern officials? All my interlocutors got excited when I asked about secession, and declared this idea absolutely intolerable. The business leaders in eastern Ukraine had told their regional officials that they had no right to talk secession, and the officials had shut up. Separatism was no threat, I was told, nor would the business commu-

nity allow it to develop.

Pleased by all this, I went back to Kiev. If they meant what they told me, the big Ukrainian businessmen are not prepared to accept a protracted political crisis, because it would cost them too much. They are willing to accept a Yushchenko presidency, and they are concerned about their reputation in the West so that they can purchase more companies in Europe. They are adamantly in favor of keeping Ukraine intact, because any breakup would disrupt their business empires. Their prime contacts are in the Ukrainian elite.

The political crisis in Ukraine is a natural result of President Kuchma's policies. On the positive side of the ledger, he has allowed a dynamic and competitive market economy to develop, but on the negative side, a handful of companies have been unfairly favored. Now, the very rich want to level the playing field with the super-rich, while ordinary

Ukrainians are fed up with corruption, lawlessness, and repression. The east-west tension seems to be a secondary issue.

Russia's extensive meddling in the Ukrainian election is curious, considering that eastern Ukraine is already longing for Europe. The best explanation seems to be President Putin's dislike for democracy, and his fear that democracy could spread from Ukraine to Russia. It is also possible that President Kuchma used Putin for his own purposes, as he schemes to play everybody off everybody else.

Ukraine is knocking on the door of the European Union. It needs help as it endeavors to clean up corruption and lawlessness. But most of all it needs access to travel, markets, and education in its beloved Europe—and the prospect of membership in the European Union. For the E.U., it will be no small challenge to welcome the Ukrainian nation that is finally being born. ♦

Taiwan Gets No Respect

Why is Washington pushing Taipei into the arms of Beijing? **BY GREG MASTEL**

TAIWAN'S economics minister, Ho Mei-yueh, visited Washington in early December with a simple message: The United States and Taiwan should negotiate a free trade agreement to deepen and expand their economic ties. Given that Taiwan is already a major U.S. trading partner and has lately resolved most of its pressing trade tensions with this country, one might expect Washington to take up the offer eagerly.

Instead, the administration has been noncommittal, while in some quarters the response is positively cool. A new study by the Institute for International Economics, a Washington think tank, suggested that Taipei's first priority should be expanding trade with China, not the United States.

It is difficult to see how this advice makes sense for either the United States or Taiwan, though it is obviously a good suggestion from Beijing's perspective.

In recent years, China's growing economic might, which already qualifies it as one of the world's largest economies and trading powers, has greatly enhanced its international influence and prestige. Particularly in Asia, every country—with the excep-

tion of Taiwan—kowtows to Beijing in hopes of gaining favor. China has shrewdly offered to negotiate free trade arrangements with other Asian countries.

Soon this web of Beijing-centered free trade agreements could effectively exclude Taipei from expanding its



Watching the stock ticker in downtown Taipei

own trade with the rest of Asia. Unfortunately for Taipei, its Asian neighbors simply see China's colossal market as more attractive than Taiwan's smaller one, preventing the island country from expanding trade with its neighbors and so stifling its economy.

Some suggest that Taiwan could pursue enhanced trade ties with China directly, but many in Taiwan rightly fear that increasing their economic dependence on the mainland would effectively strip Taiwan of its political autonomy. Could Taipei stand up to China if it were dependent on Beijing for its livelihood?

Probably not. So China's opportunistic Asian trade strategy could succeed in fulfilling Beijing's longstanding ambition to control Taiwan, an objective it has so far been unable to achieve by military means.

It would seem obvious that the United States as the world's leading democracy would want to continue to offer Taiwan an alternative to dependence on totalitarian Beijing. Just as the threat of invasion secures U.S. military support for Taiwan, so the threat of economic domination should prompt this country to extend an alternative economic opportunity to Taipei.

But the case does not end with preserving democracy and freedom. Taiwan is already the United States' eighth largest trading partner and the fifth largest economy in Asia—a much more promising partner for a free trade agreement than any of the two dozen countries with which the United States is currently negotiating such arrangements. No less a source than the U.S. International Trade Commission concluded that a U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement would benefit U.S. farmers, manufacturers, and the economy

as a whole. Beyond that, the United States has an obvious interest in ensuring that it is not economically shut out of Asia by new Chinese free trade agreements, which is why the United States is now negotiating with Asian countries that have less to offer than Taiwan.

Against all these considerations, it is strange indeed that it would be left to Minister Ho to carry the message that a U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement is good policy—and stranger still that she should be met with the suggestion that she look instead to China. They must be delighted in Beijing. ♦

Greg Mastel is chief international trade adviser at Miller & Chevalier.

Bloomberg News / Landov / David Hartung

Make the Tax Cuts Permanent

Now.

BY STEPHEN MOORE AND JEFFREY BELL

IF JOHN KERRY had been elected president, one of the clearest consequences would have been a bleak future for the major tax cuts signed into law by President Bush in 2001 and 2003 (most of which are scheduled to expire between 2008 and 2010). The tax issue was the most contentious issue of domestic policy confrontation between Bush and Kerry. Kerry saw Bush's cuts as a giveaway to the rich, while the president argued they were central to the economic recovery and gave financial relief to working families who needed it most. Bush promised in every debate and nearly every campaign appearance to make the tax cuts a permanent fixture of the tax code. Yet there is increasing White House talk of putting this off till much later in 2005.

Jon Kyl, the Republican senator from Arizona, believes Republicans should deliver on this Bush promise in the first 100 days of the second term. Kyl argues persuasively that "if President Bush has a voter mandate to do anything on economic policy, it's to make those tax cuts permanent. We should cash those chips in right now." Kyl complains that several of his Republican colleagues want to put the vote off for months, possibly even make it wait in line behind the elephantine issue of Social Security reform. That questionable strategy might mean Bush could end up with neither.

Tactically, putting off this vote makes very little sense. If Bush were to

lock into place the cuts in capital gains tax and the dividend taxes to a 15 percent rate, the income tax rate reductions, the \$1,000 per child tax credit, and the death tax repeal, the economy and the stock market would certainly reward him with a further burst of growth. Since these tax cuts were first implemented in May 2003, the Dow Jones Industrial average has increased by nearly 30 percent and GDP has surged forward by 4.5 percent. Without the stimulative effect of these tax cuts, John Kerry's tailor might now be measuring him for a new Inauguration Day suit.

The only reason these growth stimulants were passed as temporary changes in the first place was to fit within the straitjacket of Senate budget rules that have since expired. The longer the tax cuts are left on a temporary basis, the less salience they have for America's economic future, particularly when it comes to the unfolding decisions of long-term investors.

Politically, Bush needs to pocket some early and meaningful legislative victories. The tax cut is the logical choice here, as it is favored by every element of the Bush-Reagan coalition that delivered the sweeping victory on Election Day. Bush owes this to his loyal voter base.

There is one faction within the GOP that wants to put off tax cuts, and that is the deficit reduction crowd. They insist that the tax cuts must be "paid for" before they are made permanent. Yet, the evidence shows that because the Bush tax cuts revived economic activity in 2004, the Treasury collected about \$60 billion more in tax revenues than was expected during the year, and the deficit

shrank by \$103 billion from its projected level. So the cuts already are paying for themselves. Moreover, the deficit hawks should be refocusing their ire at the source of the red ink problem: out of control federal spending.

Whether intended or not, the delayed tax cut gratification strategy is an engraved invitation to congressional critics of the Bush tax cuts to reopen the campaign 2004 debate on whether they ever should have passed—or whether they are still worthwhile given the new bugaboos of high budget deficits and a weakened dollar. (How raising taxes on domestic investment could possibly strengthen the dollar is never explained.) Delay simply means that every element of the first-term tax cut agenda becomes a bargaining chip for the pro-tax Nancy Pelosi Democrats and some squeamish Republicans, such as Senate Finance Committee chairman Charles Grassley.

Another strategic problem has emerged: Some Republicans, like the normally sensible Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, say that in order to "pay for" Social Security reform, Congress is going to need to enact some tax increases, not tax cuts. This complicates things mightily. Graham favors raising the effective top tax rate on wages to at least 50.3 percent for most families making more than \$87,900, now the statutory ceiling for the payroll tax. Graham even acknowledged in a December 11 *Fox News Sunday* interview that unless tax increases are a big part of Social Security reform, it would be wrong to make Bush's first-term tax cuts permanent. In short, he invites bargaining away the tax cut as part of some grand deal.

Bush's biggest legacy so far on domestic policy is his successful completion of the Reagan supply-side tax-cutting agenda. Locking in this first-term achievement would be a vindication of Bush's pro-growth policies. Indeed, a victory on the tax bill puts Bush in a stronger position to tackle Social Security and tax reform.

Conversely, a failure to cement his tax cuts into place would represent a

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startling, unexpected and early setback on several levels. Economically, the tax cuts will become less and less of a stimulus as their expiration dates approach. Politically, the president will be seen as having broken a central pledge of his reelection victory over John Kerry. On a more fundamental level, does Bush really want to preside in his second term over the effective repeal of his most impressive first-term domestic achievement?

That the strong-willed and politically astute Bush White House would, whether consciously or absent-mindedly, risk blowing a political and economic victory of such magnitude is, to put it mildly, one of Washington's biggest postelection puzzles. The president should intervene to make sure the very first item of business in the new Congress is an up-or-down vote on making permanent every one of his first-term tax cuts and reforms. Invest political capital here, and it will pay dividends in more legislative wins in the months ahead. ♦

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Thanksgiving for Turkey

Europe moves east, and Turkey moves West.

BY MUSTAFA AKYOL

Istanbul
WITH LAST WEEK'S vote in Brussels, the admission of Turkey to the European Union has come one step nearer. Yet some still suspect that the accession of an overwhelmingly Muslim nation to the E.U. will signify an alarming new intrusion of Islam into a continent already uneasy about its Muslim minorities. Some fear—to put it more provocatively—that Turkish membership in the E.U. will turn out to be an Islamic Trojan horse.

Indeed, if one sees Islam as a monolithic faith, and reckons its influence simply by counting its adherents, the doubters could well be right. If, however, the reality is more complex, it may be that Turkey's accession to the E.U. will help remedy, not aggravate, Europe's Muslim problem. To see this, it is necessary to appreciate the distinctive nature of Turkish Islam.

Compared with the Arabs, the Turks were latecomers to the Muslim faith. The former were politically and intellectually more advanced until the 13th century, when the Arabs' brilliant civilization was nearly destroyed by one of the most devastating conquests ever, the Mongol catastrophe. The Arabs never recovered, and the leadership of Islam passed to the Turks. The Turks flourished, especially under the Ottoman Empire, the global superpower of the 16th and much of the 17th centuries. Although it then entered a steady decline, the Ottoman Empire survived as a powerful state until World War I.

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The political power of the Turks, and their continual interaction with the West, gave them an important insight: They learned to face facts. While the Arabs stagnated in their closed tribal universe, the Turks had to rule an empire, make practical decisions, adopt new technologies, and reform existing structures. This praxis helped them develop new religious perceptions, too. During the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566), for instance, the sultan's head of Islamic affairs, Ebussuud Effendi, authorized the charging of interest by foundations working for the betterment of society. This is still a revolutionary idea in the Islamic world, where banking is generally associated with the usury denounced in the Koran. To this day, legal and theological gymnastics are required to make Western banking and investment acceptable to most Muslims.

During the 18th century, the Ottomans started to reform their age-old *sharia* laws. A big step was the abolition of slavery. While this was a non-issue in many parts of the empire, there were strong reactions from the Arab Middle East, whose tribal social structure still relied on slaves. The fiercest resistance took the form of a revolt in the Arabian peninsula—led by none other than Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the eponymous founder of Wahhabism, the fanatical sect that is breeding most Islamic terrorists today.

After World War I, Turkey became an independent nation. Here again, its experience differed from that of the Arab world, which was colonized by the British and the French. The colonial experience of the interwar period

gave rise to an anti-Western nationalism in nearly all the Arab states, to which Turkey was immune. After World War II, when most Arab states became allies of the Soviet Union, Turkey again took a different path and aligned itself with the United States and NATO.

All this history infused Turkish Islam with a far more friendly outlook toward the West. During much of the 20th century, the No. 1 enemy for Turkey's pious Muslims was "godless communism," and the United States was perceived as a valuable ally against that hated threat. Probably the most influential Islamic sage in Turkey in the last hundred years, Said Nursi, repeatedly called for an alliance between Christianity and Islam against communism and its underlying materialist philosophy. Some of his followers proudly joined in the Korean War.

Turkish Islam has been free of anti-Semitism, too. The Ottoman Empire welcomed the Jews expelled from Spain in 1492, and ever since, Jews have lived peacefully in Turkish lands. The Arab-Israeli conflict, although it has generated sympathy among Turks for the plight of the Palestinians, never created widespread hatred of Israel, let alone Jews in general.

Despite all this, it is true that Turkey has had its own radical Islamist movements, especially since the early 1980s. But they were not homegrown. Arab, Pakistani, and Iranian ideologues of radical Islam—such as Sayyid Qutb, Sayyid Abul-Ala Mawdudi, and Ali Shariati—inspired a generation of Islamists, who found their Turkish Islamic past too pacifist. The political Islamism that would carry Necmettin Erbakan's Refah ("Welfare") party to power in 1996 was also of foreign origin: It was modeled on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and exploited the radicalism of the aforementioned Islamist youth. But in the late 1990s, this movement lost steam. Its more liberal faction gave birth to the AKP, which has been in

power since November 2002 and is leading Turkey's E.U. effort more successfully than any previous Turkish government.

Some Westerners, along with some hard-core secularists in Turkey, fear that the AKP's move toward democracy could be a *taqiyyah*, a tactical deception allowing the party to carry out a secret Islamist agenda. Yet there is not a shred of evidence to support



A reconstruction of the Trojan horse in Troy, Turkey

that conspiracy theory. Some recent "evidence," such as the AKP's attempts to make adultery illegal and give religious-school graduates greater access to secular universities, should more properly be seen as the party's effort to appease its conservative voters.

In fact, the decline of radical Islamism in Turkey is no superficial defeat; it is supported by many Islamic thinkers, including some who have renounced a radical past in favor of democracy. Furthermore, Turkey has many modernist theologians who envisage a comprehensive renewal in Islam, and they find considerable support among the public.

In short, Turkey is the archetype of what is called "moderate Islam."

Thus, its entry into the E.U. should be seen as an antidote to the radical misinterpretation of Islam, not as a religious threat to the West.

Some Westerners see a catch in this argument. They think that Turkish Islam is moderate only because it was marginalized and suppressed during the early Turkish Republic, under the one-party rule of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This line of reasoning leads to the suspicion that if Turkey deepens its democracy to satisfy the E.U., it will only unleash the previously marginalized Islam and invite a fundamentalist backlash.

The moderation of Turkish Islam, however, is not a product of the Kemalist period. Rather, it is the product of a long process of modernization of which Kemalism was just one phase. An important phase, to be sure, but still a phase.

Turkish modernization began at least a century before Kemalism. In the 19th century, the Ottomans produced a new secular civil law, a constitution, a parliament, and Western-style schools and universities. They also encouraged sophisticated intellectual debate. Even Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), the most "Islamist" sultan of the later empire, launched an extensive modernization program that included the founding of modern schools where the Young Turks would flourish. In 1895, Descartes's *Discourse on Method* was translated into Turkish under the auspices of the sultan. Many other Western classics, as well as the political debates of the day in Europe, became part of Ottoman intellectual life. And this was embraced not just by the secular Young Turks, but also by more open-minded Islamists.

That heritage makes Turkish Islam—along with the Islam of the Balkans—a unique manifestation of Islamic modernity. Turkey would introduce this modern Islam into Europe, which is currently troubled by an undesirable version of the same faith. The E.U., then, would be wise to welcome the Turks for its own sake.

Whatever the arguments for Turk-

ish ties to Europe, of course, many Turks attach greater importance to an even more fundamental alliance with the United States.

Actually, Turkey is closer to the United States than it is to Europe in many respects—most notably, the role of religion in public life. Many Turkish conservatives, including me, find the spirit of a “nation under God” much more appealing than the bluntly secular European ethos. It is unfortunate that when the Europeans recently decided to exclude any mention of God from the E.U. constitution, Turkey’s liberal intelligentsia, including some public officials, expressed the view that such a secular union would be a better fit for Turkey than one that acknowledged any religious allegiance. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (whose objections to Turkey’s accession had earlier alienated many Turks) was wiser when he commented, “It has been said that the European Constitution could not mention the Judeo-Christian roots so as not to offend Islam, but what offends Islam is contempt for God.” Conservative Turks couldn’t agree more.

As to the Mars/Venus dichotomy between the United States and Europe, we Turks would line up with the Americans on the Martian side. Notwithstanding the controversy over the Iraq war, we realize that, in the grand scheme of things, “Old Europe” has displayed a lack of vision and initiative that is not commendable. We well remember that the same Europe did nothing to save our ex-Ottoman Muslim brethren in Bosnia during the 1990s, and it was the United States that halted the Serbs’ ghastly ethnic cleansing.

But the United States is not inviting us to join its Union. Besides, there is an ocean between us. Rather, Turkey’s destination is Europe. And if we reach it, the effect will be to change the world. Europeans remember with distaste the Ottoman siege of Vienna. Once the gates of Vienna are open to the Turks, however, and the gates of Istanbul are open to Europeans, the age of sieges will be well and truly over. ♦

When Harry Met Roe

The new Senate minority leader is no pro-lifer.

BY FRED BARNES

JOE KLEIN, writing in *Time*, says Senate Democratic leader Harry Reid is “pro-life.” The *New York Times* quotes Washington lobbyist Frank Fahrenkopf, the former Republican national chairman, as saying about Reid, “He’s pro-life.”

In the *Washington Post*, after Reid was elevated to his leadership post, columnist E.J. Dionne labeled him “an opponent of abortion rights.” And as far back as 1997, *Post* political writer David Broder wrote that Reid is “pro-life.” So it’s all but unanimous in the press that the Nevada senator is a serious foe of legalized abortion.

But is he really? As commonly applied, the term “pro-life” refers to someone who actively works to ban abortion or at least to reduce substantially the number of abortions. We know Reid’s personal view. It’s that abortion should be allowed only in the case of rape, incest, or if the mother’s life is at stake. But that alone doesn’t make him a pro-lifer. After all, there are political figures like Senators John Kerry and Teddy Kennedy who insist they frown on abortion but favor

keeping it legal in all or almost all cases. No one considers Kerry or Kennedy to be pro-life. Is Reid the same? He has used the same language as Kennedy (“I am personally opposed to abortion”) in letters to constituents.

I’ve devised a straightforward, three-pronged test for whether a politician or national leader should legitimately be called pro-life. First, does the person speak out publicly against abortion or for related pro-life causes? Second, does the person participate vigorously in efforts to protect the unborn or, if a legislator, at least vote to do so? Third, do pro-life forces see the person as an ally or do pro-abortion lobbyists look kindly on the person? To be a pro-lifer a person wouldn’t necessarily have to pass all three parts, but two out of three would seem to be the minimum required to be considered an authentic pro-lifer. Let’s see how Reid fares.

Reid hasn’t been exactly full-throated in opposition to abortion. His press secretary, Tessa Hafen, says he “has spoken out” often, but she cites only his December 5 appearance on *Meet the Press*. Host Tim Russert asked Reid if he favors overturning *Roe v. Wade*, the 1973 Supreme Court decision



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Illustration by Earl Keelney

legalizing abortion. The standard pro-life response is yes. Reid didn't answer one way or the other. Russert asked twice and Reid ducked both times. He said the Supreme Court "has wrestled with this for years and years. And, as you know, they're having a difficult time coming up with what should or shouldn't be done." Actually, the court decided in *Roe v. Wade* to create a right to an abortion and later reaffirmed that decision.

Still, Reid said his "views on abortion are very clear. I've never tried to hide them." He said this immediately before hiding his view on reversing *Roe v. Wade*. Reid added, "I clearly oppose abortion." And he made a case for working "toward reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies, unintended pregnancies. . . . That would, of course, lead to fewer abortions. That should be a goal we all have." Oddly, while talking about abortion, Reid said Senator Barbara Boxer of California is the closest thing he's ever had to a sister. Boxer is passionately pro-abortion. I think the only fair verdict on Reid as a pro-life spokesman is that he isn't one.

Reid's reputation as an opponent of abortion rests partly on votes in 1999 and 2003 against the Harkin amendment, which endorsed *Roe v. Wade*. Today, Reid is the only remaining Democratic senator who voted no both times. He also voted for a ban on partial-birth abortion and for a bill making the killer of a pregnant woman guilty of two murders—one for the woman's life and one for the unborn child's. Those votes bolster Reid's pro-life credentials.

But there's more to the story. The Harkin resolution was merely an expression of Senate sentiment. It wasn't binding. On partial-birth abortion, Reid voted initially for a substitute bill that would have gutted the ban. And on the two-victims legislation, he demonstrably backed a measure proposed by Senator Dianne Feinstein of California that would have done just the opposite, codified that only one victim was involved. Reid and then-Senate Democratic leader Tom Daschle ostentatiously

cast the first two votes for the Feinstein bill. It lost by one vote.

After President Bush reinstated the so-called Mexico City policy which bars funds from overseas organizations that perform or promote abortions, Reid moved to block the president's action. His amendment was never enacted. Reid also supported attempts to revive American funds for the United Nations Population Fund, some of whose money aids coercive abortions in China. These attempts to stymie the pro-life efforts failed. So what's the bottom line on Reid as a reliable legislative battler on behalf of the unborn? He's not one.

Finally, there's the matter of Reid's allies and opponents on abortion. Klein quotes Kate Michelman, the former head of NARAL Pro-Choice America, as saying of Reid, "I'm honored to be his friend." When Reid ran for Democratic leader, neither NARAL nor Planned Parenthood voiced a peep of opposition. And *WeNews*, an online publication for women, concluded Reid's ascension wouldn't affect the strong pro-abortion position of Senate Democrats. Meanwhile, Douglas Johnson, the

chief lobbyist for National Right to Life, said Reid "is certainly no ally of the pro-life movement. He usually votes against pro-life interests when it matters most." Thus, Reid turns out to be, again, closer to the pro-abortion side than the pro-life.

In 1985, when Reid was a House member, he published a newspaper ad citing ten antiabortion votes he'd made. Better yet, the ad included an endorsement by Republican Rep. Henry Hyde of Illinois, the leading pro-life spokesman on Capitol Hill. Reid, Hyde said, "has never failed to support . . . the issues that concern the family and the pre-born." A decade later, Reid had found wiggle room on abortion. He'd come up with a different take.

Voters in Reid's home state approved a referendum in 1990 making *Roe v. Wade* the law in Nevada. "I respect that decision and believe it should only be changed by another vote of the people of Nevada," Reid wrote constituents a few years later. "I will review all proposed abortion legislation with this perspective." And so he has. A real pro-lifer wouldn't have. ♦

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Getting Gaza Right

The key to progress for the Palestinians.

BY ROBERT SATLOFF

THE MOST FREQUENT CRITICISM of President Bush's Middle East policy is that he has been too hands-off. Unless America takes the lead, so the argument goes, the "peace process" will languish. In other words, U.S. activism is the key to progress.

This is, by and large, bad analysis and a bum rap. The *level* of activity—the frequency of presidential summits, White House meetings, shuttle diplomacy, signing ceremonies, and the like—is far less important than the *direction* of policy. And on the latter score, the Bush administration seems poised to reap dividends.

Bush's strategy depended on three pillars: U.S. recognition of Israel's right to respond to terrorism; U.S. commitment to the creation of a democratic Palestinian state alongside Israel; and U.S. refusal to truck with Palestinian leaders "compromised by terror." Each pillar was backed up with operational content, such as Washington's promise to veto one-sided anti-Israel resolutions at the U.N. Security Council, the administration's endorsement of a "road map" to Palestinian statehood, and the president's principled stand against dealing with Yasser Arafat after the latter lied about the 50 tons of shipborne weapons he tried to smuggle into Gaza.

After holding fast to these three pillars, the administration is about to enter a second term in which the prospects for substantial progress toward peace look brighter than at any point in years. Of course, it took

an act of God—the death of Arafat—to sweep away the underbrush that impeded progress. But the administration's approach has been critical in at least two key respects.

First, Washington's support for Israel's right to self-defense emboldened a Likud-led Israeli government that had taken substantial security measures, such as the construction of the "separation fence," to see that its own interest was best served by a decision to withdraw from Gaza and the northern West Bank. This will include the dismantling of Jewish settlements there. When it occurs in mid-2005, Israel's "disengagement" will constitute a huge leap—both in psychology and in strategy—rivaling the original Oslo accords in historic importance.

Second, Washington's stand against terrorism and for a more democratic Palestinian leadership has emboldened those Palestinians who believe statehood will never be achieved through the barrel of a gun. For some, this is a question of morality ("terrorism is wrong"); for others, it is merely an issue of practicality ("terrorism plays into the hands of Israel"). But now that a champion of the "armed intifada," Marwan Barghouti, has dropped out of the presidential race, Palestinian voters will almost certainly elect Mahmoud Abbas president of the Palestinian Authority on January 9. Abbas is no pushover on substantive issues, but he rejects the pistol-in-one-hand-and-olive-branch-in-the-other strategy that was Arafat's stock in trade.

These two key changes—Israel's disengagement and, if it occurs, the emergence of a new Palestinian lead-

ership committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict—will converge in 2005. The task for the administration is to capitalize on the moment to advance the prospect of a secure peace.

Two paths are possible. One can be termed "Diplomacy now!" Convinced that Arafat was himself the main impediment to peace, the administration could press both sides to reengage in high-level negotiations. The goal would be either a new set of Oslo-style interim deals or even the elusive final resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A second path comes under the banner of "Building for peace." This approach gives priority to sinking a firm foundation for each of the two new developments—Israeli disengagement and Palestinian political development—as the basis for further progress. It would focus on ensuring an orderly and peaceful transfer of authority in Gaza and the emergence of a Palestinian government that would merit, by its performance, generous terms over the West Bank and eventual entry into the community of sovereign states.

Each path has its advocates. Both will cunningly blur the distinctions between their two approaches. But these are two very different paths. Only one will lead to durable progress—the second approach.

"Diplomacy now!" may be emotionally satisfying, but it will have the practical effect of breaking Israel's already fragile government while forcing Palestinians to make a detour around internal reform. In contrast, the incremental approach will ensure that each party puts its own house in order as a prelude to tackling the difficult decisions ahead. For Israel, that can be best achieved once disengagement is seen as a boon to Israeli security. For Palestinians, that can be best achieved once a new government—reasonably representative, reasonably transparent, reasonably well-functioning—is up and running.

For Washington, the great irony is that ensuring the success of the incrementalist path will require a much higher level of activism than during

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the president's first term. It is just a different kind of activism than we have seen before. It could include the following:

¶ The appointment not of a Middle East peace envoy but rather a presidential representative for Palestinian reconstruction and development. This should be someone who could marshal the energies of key Western and Arab countries, U.N. agencies, international financial institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations to help make Gaza a functioning economic entity.

¶ A doubling of the U.S. commitment to Palestinian refugees by helping to fund the creation of a modern construction and property-rights system in exchange for closing down the Gaza operations of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency, which has acceded to a miserable Palestinian housing policy for decades.

¶ Aid to boost the Palestinian economy, by offering tax incentives for U.S. companies to open operations in Gaza and hire local workers and by injecting new funds into educational opportunities for young Palestinians, including providing U.S. aid to build and operate an American-style, English-language university in Gaza, as we do in Cairo and Beirut.

Washington neither can nor should do this alone. Europe is keen to busy itself with Mideast peace activity, which the Bush administration should channel in a "Gaza first" direction. And despite windfall profits from high oil prices, Arab countries still owe hundreds of millions of dollars in unfulfilled commitments to the Palestinian Authority. The United States should condition any new U.S. funding of Gaza reconstruction on payment of these outstanding pledges.

Focusing on Gaza is not as sexy as hosting peace summits; no one will ever win a Nobel Peace Prize for turning Gaza into a working proposition. But unless friends of peace invest in the success of Gaza disengagement—for both Israelis and Palestinians—peace will remain a chimera for a long time. ♦

The Price of Discrimination

Set-asides may die soon, now that officials are being held liable. BY JOHN SULLIVAN & GEORGE LA NOUE

IN 1989, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision that appeared to signal the end of racial preferences in public contracting. In *City of Richmond v. Croson*, a plumbing company (Croson) had successfully bid to install toilets in the city jail. Richmond (like many local governments) required that 30 percent of its construction spending go to minority subcontractors. When Croson failed to find a minority-owned subcontractor for the job, the city rebid the contract, prompting Croson's suit. Overturning set-asides like Richmond's, the justices noted the role of racial politics in creating such programs and set an extremely high threshold for their continuance. Indeed, in the ensuing years, plaintiffs won 24 of 25 cases against state and local business preference programs.

Still, like kudzu, preferences have proved difficult to eradicate. Masked by evasive terminology and justified by tendentious studies, minority business set-asides persist. Politicians know that lawsuits against such programs are costly and time-consuming, and they are not above retaliating against firms with the temerity to sue. And if the government loses after years of litigation, the taxpayers cover the legal fees.

Now that calculus may change, because a federal judge in Miami has just given the victims of preferences an important new tool. On November

10, the governing board of the South Florida Water Management District (\$792 million budget) recommended ending its two-decade-old contracting preference program, even though there was no pending litigation. Board members had become worried about being held personally liable for implementing the program. The source of their concern was a new federal ruling.

The case that got the board's attention is *Hershell Gill Consulting Engineers v. Miami-Dade County*. Gill is a small firm with fewer than a dozen employees earning about \$1 million annually. While most of its work is in the private sector, the company wanted the opportunity to contract with Dade County. However, Gill Engineering is owned by a white male, and the county required that at least 42 percent of the dollars awarded in architecture and engineering contracts go to blacks, Hispanics, and women. The policy severely disadvantaged Gill.

Dade County's contracting preferences began in the 1980s. In 1996, the county lost an expensive case about construction preferences, but preserved preferences in all other purchase areas. By 1998, the county manager and the county attorney's office recommended that preferences be abandoned in architecture and engineering contracts because "parity" for the favored groups had been reached. Because of Florida's sunshine laws this recommendation was broadcast on cable television. The county commissioners, however, twice rejected the recommendation and refused to modify the program.

The commissioners then decided they needed a new consultant's study

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to justify the policy they wanted to preserve. (In theory, a showing that the county engaged in systemic discrimination might justify remedial preferences.) So a new study was churned out at significant expense to the county's taxpayers. This study was so badly flawed that its author admitted at trial, "We do have some problems in the data." As Judge Adalberto Jordan wryly concluded, that admission, "in my view, is a vast understatement."

Worse than the data deficiencies, the court concluded, was the fact that the study "fails to identify who is engaging in the discrimination, what form the discrimination might take, at what stage in the process it is taking place, or how the discrimination is accomplished." Consequently the court issued an order in 2000 ending the county's racial and gender preferences in architecture and engineering contracts.

But other county preferences remained, and the plaintiffs asked the court to hold the commissioners personally liable for their persistent willingness to discriminate against white-owned firms. During the *Gill* trial each commissioner was called to testify about why the commission had continued the county's discriminatory program in the face of professional advice that such conduct was not legally defensible. There is a history behind this tactic: At key moments during the civil rights movement, the threat of personal liability was used to force school boards and voting registrars to quit discriminating. Now a court was being asked to use the same tool when the victims were white.

Having shut down the preference program, Judge Jordan waited four more years to rule on the liability issue. He solved the problem of traditional judicial deference to legislative autonomy by finding that the commissioners could not be held liable for enacting an unconstitutional program, but that in their role as approvers of individual contracts the commissioners were taking on an administrative role. They could thus be held liable for discriminatory con-

duct when they took that action. "The Commissioners are not entitled to qualified immunity and are liable for any compensatory and punitive damages in their individual capacities," the judge held.

The court was no doubt influenced by the undisguised spoils system it found in Dade County. A majority of the commissioners are Hispanic. "It is probably not happenstance," the court concluded, "that Hispanics receive the highest" set-aside: 25 percent. Women are a majority of the county's population and come close to forming a majority on the commission. "Again, not surprisingly," the judge declared, "women have the second-highest" goal. Blacks represent a minority on the commission; "not coincidentally, they get the lowest" goal, 12 percent. Only one member of the county commission was a white male and, of course, no goals were established for the benefit of companies owned by white males.

What also impressed the court was the failure of the county to take seriously its own 1997 antidiscrimination ordinance. No witness could point to a single complaint brought under the law through the years. As the court said, this absence of complaints meant either that the ordinance was not being enforced or there was no discrimination in the county's contracting process. Either way, there was no justification for the preference program. In the end, the court decided not to levy damages against the commissioners for their past conduct. But Judge Jordan warned that in the future, if preferences were used and the record were as deficient as it was in *Gill*, the "consequences will be severe" and "punitive damages will be a virtual certainty."

Perhaps this time the Dade commissioners got the message. The county decided not to appeal the court's decision and the county attorney has advised the commissioners to get out of the business of racial preferences in public contracting. That's sound advice. The *Gill* decision has damaged preferences permanently. Few local governments have anti-

discrimination ordinances that are enforced effectively. Few have evidence that discrimination is taking place. Many preferential contract programs were established through racial politics every bit as blatant as Dade County's. And local administrators of preference programs are now on notice: They are no longer merely flouting the Constitution; they're putting their own assets at risk.

Gill will likely have a ripple effect on preference programs of all kinds across the country. The South Florida Water Management District is only the first *Gill* casualty. If the people who approve preferences on public contracts have to reach into their own wallets to pay for their unconstitutional behavior, few, if any, of these programs will survive. ♦

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Holland Daze

The Dutch rethink multiculturalism

BY CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL

Amsterdam

The small city of Schiedam, on the Nieuwe Maas river near Rotterdam, has played a big role in the Dutch imagination of late. Five years ago, the historian/journalist Geert Mak entranced the country with a long narrative called *My Father's Century*. It is still in bookshop windows and is now in its 27th printing. It begins in Mak's great-grandparents' sail-making business in Schiedam, and follows the lives of his family members as they collide with Dutch history in the twentieth century: the Dutch Reformed faith they drifted in and out of, the herring they ate, how much money they made, what it felt like to live under Nazi occupation, their shyness (or boldness) about sex, the jokes they told, and how they faced the 1960s. The book consoled Dutch people that however tumultuous the changes the 20th century had wrought, there was an ineffable "Dutchness" that somehow perdured. Schiedam played the role in the Dutch imagination that Macomb County, Michigan, or Luckenbach, Texas, did in the American imagination in the mid-1980s: You could look there to see how the "real" people in the country lived.

Early this month, another Schiedam native, a 30-year-old man known in his police dossier as Farid A., was found guilty of issuing death threats over the Internet. When the conservative Dutch politician Geert Wilders described Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat last year as a "terrorist leader," Farid A. posted a picture of him on an Islamist website urging: "Wilders must be punished with death for his fascistic comments about Islam, Muslims, and the Palestinian cause." That was a year ago, and since then, Wilders has done even more to tick off Muslim radicals. He left the conservative Freedom and Democracy People's party (VVD) after a personal spat with the party leadership, promising to launch his own "Geert Wilders List," along the lines of the one-person movement that turned the gay populist Pim Fortuyn into the most popular politician in the Netherlands in early 2002. Wilders

has focused on Turkey, crime, and the unsustainability of high immigration. He has warned that many of the more than 1 million Muslims who live in the Netherlands "have already opted for radical Islam," and has urged closing extremist mosques.

There is a market for his forthrightness. In early November, a poll in the left-leaning daily *de Volkskrant* showed that Wilders could win several hundred thousand votes, which would translate into nine seats in the Tweede Kamer, the lower house of the national legislature. When the gadfly filmmaker Theo van Gogh was shot and knifed in southeastern Amsterdam on November 2, the letter that his killer pinned with a knife to his corpse contained a promise to do the same to the Somali-born feminist VVD member of parliament Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Wilders got similar threats shortly thereafter. There were two results for Wilders. First, his popularity shot through the roof: A second poll in *de Volkskrant* showed Wilders would now win almost 2 million voters, taking 28 seats, or a fifth of the parliament, and that he was drawing support across party lines and in every single sector of Dutch society, despite—or perhaps because of—perceptions that he is a single-issue candidate.

But Wilders also had to go into hiding. He now appears in public only for legislative sessions in the Hague, where he travels under armed guard. He complained in mid-December that the death threats had hampered his ability to build his party. The head of a conservative think tank told newspapers he had been advised by security personnel to stay away from Wilders. Anyone who declared himself for one of those 28 seats that looked ripe for the plucking would thereby place himself on a death list, too. One strange but highly professional video that can be downloaded off the Internet shows drawings of machine guns, then photographs of Wilders with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and then captioned panels reading:

name: geert wilders
occupation: idolator
sin: mocking Islam
punishment: beheading
reward: Paradise, in sha Allah

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In early December, an appeals court in the Hague con-



AP / Fred Ernst

The Mevlana mosque in Rotterdam, under guard after the murder of Theo van Gogh

firmed the punishment of Farid A. of Schiedam. He was sentenced to 120 hours of community service.

ONLY THE BEGINNING

This is why the murder of one Dutch filmmaker 911 days after 9/11 is described by people in Holland as having had the same effect on their country as the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 in the World Trade Center towers. Dutch people have the sense that, for the first time in centuries, the thread that connects them to the world of Geert Mak's father, and *that* world to the world of Erasmus and Spinoza and Rembrandt and William the Silent, is in danger of being snipped. Part of it is the size and the speed of the recent non-European immigration. The Netherlands, with a population of 16 million, has about 3 million foreign-born. By some estimates, a quarter of them do not speak Dutch.

What's more, the public has been told for two decades now that they ain't seen nothing yet, that this is only the first wave of a long era of immigration, which they'd better learn to love. The immigrants the country now hosts have been difficult to manage. Part of the problem is the interaction of high immigration and what was for years a generous, no-questions-asked welfare state: As many as 60 percent of Moroccans and Turks above the age of 40—obviously first-generation immigrants—are unemployed, in the only major economy in Europe that has consistently had unemployment at or below American rates.

Most of these immigrants are Muslims. Muslim immigrants had begun to scare people long before Pim Fortuyn, the charismatic populist, turned himself into the country's most popular politician in the space of a few weeks in 2002, by arguing that the country was already overloaded with newcomers. (Fortuyn was assassinated by an animal-rights activist in May of that year.) Already in the 1990s, there were reports of American-style shootouts in schools, one involving two Turkish students in the town of Veghel. This past October, newspaper readers were riveted by the running saga of a quiet married couple who had been hounded out of the previously livable Amsterdam neighborhood of Diamantbuurt by gangs of Muslim youths. There were incidents of wild rejoicing across Holland in the wake of the September 11 attacks, notably in the eastern city of Ede. The weekly magazine *Contrast* took a poll showing that just under half the Muslims in the Netherlands were in "complete sympathy" with the September 11 attacks. At least some wish to turn to terrorism. In the wake of the van Gogh murder, Pakistani, Kurdish, and Moroccan terrorist cells were discovered. The Hague-based "Capital Network," out of which van Gogh's killer Mohammed Bouyeri came, had contact with terrorists who carried out bombings in Casablanca in 2003. Perhaps the most alarming revelation was that an Islamist mole was working as a translator in the AIVD, the national investigative service, and tipping off local radicals to impending operations.

The question naturally arises: If immigrants behave

this way now, what will happen when they are far more numerous, as all authorities have long promised they will be? It has been estimated that the country's two largest cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, will be "majority minority" very soon (Rotterdam is today at 47 percent), and already 65 percent of primary and secondary students in both cities are of non-Dutch parentage. London's *Daily Telegraph*, citing immigration experts and government statistics, reported a net outflow of 13,000 people from Holland in the first six months of 2004, the first such deficit in half a century. One must treat this statistic carefully—it could be an artifact of an aging population in which many are retiring to warmer places. But it could also be the beginning of something resembling the American suburban phenomenon of "white flight," occurring at the level of an entire country.

THE PILLARS FALL

Perhaps the Dutch did with immigration what most countries do with most things: They thought too much about their own history, and then misapplied it. The concept that Dutch political scientists use more than any other to describe their society is "pillarization." For all that it is thought of as a Protestant society, the Netherlands is a quarter Catholic. Over the centuries a system of separate institutions developed. In the world of Geert Mak's father, Catholics not only went to their own churches but also had their own schools, newspapers, trade unions, social clubs, and the like. Protestants lived in a similarly separate world. There was a secular pillar as well. Elites from these different walks of life met to carve out a *modus vivendi* among different confessional groups.

The Netherlands was a society with a high level of religious affiliation and intensity—as it still is in its own "Bible Belt," which stretches in a rough southwest-to-northeast diagonal across the country. A political system that empowered church-affiliated organizations to perform temporal tasks created a mighty role for religion. That is why the world revolution of the 1960s—which was seen as a revolution against class in Britain, against de Gaulle in France, against the World War II generation in Germany, and against Vietnam in the United States—was seen in Holland as a rebellion against church authority.

The natural result was the libertine public square that will be recognized by any American who visited the Netherlands with a Eurail Pass at age 18—the Milky Way, the legalized prostitution, hashish in the "coffee shops," the laissez-faire immigration policy, a law enforcement system whereunder you get 120 hours of community service for threatening to kill someone. The essential fact about this dispensation, at the political level, is that most

Dutch people don't like it. Eighty percent of Netherlanders tell pollsters their country is "too tolerant." But the post-sixties tolerance seemed to have antecedents in the national mythology: Apostles of the new ethic claimed—without much justification—the mantle of the pre-Enlightenment tolerance that once led the Netherlands to welcome persecuted dissenters from across Europe: Huguenots from France, Jews from Spain, the *Mayflower* pilgrims from England.

This conflation of two regimes had its appeal even to conservatives who were unhappy with the new world of hashish, gay marriage, and euthanasia. Better to claim to be pursuing a difficult but very Dutch social arrangement than to admit to having been wiped out in a political struggle. The Dutch talked themselves into believing that this valueslessness was a perennial feature of their society. When immigrants began to arrive, authorities fantasized that they'd seen it all before—after all, they'd welcomed John Locke and René Descartes. So they could build up an "immigrant" or a "Muslim" pillar and then let it collapse into postmodern individualism, following the same historic route that Protestantism and Catholicism had taken, as if that route were the product of an iron historical law. In came an ultra-neutral, respect-centered vocabulary: Foreigners became "allochthonous," as opposed to natives, who were henceforth "autochthonous." In the 1980s, the government started creating Muslim schools. It poured public money into the construction of mosques.

There were two voices warning that history was not following this multicultural script. In 1991, Frits Bolkestein, the conservative statesman who occupies a position in Dutch political life that is an odd mix of Ronald Reagan and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, wrote a long article in *de Volkskrant* in which he warned that there was nothing inevitable about assimilation. Noting the threat of Muslim separatism to freedom of religion and freedom of expression, he warned, "Everyone in the Netherlands, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, is expected to obey the laws that stem from these principles." He was dismissed as a reactionary, and worse.

THE MULTICULTURAL DRAMA

In 2000, the journalist and literary critic Paul Scheffer wrote an article called "The Multicultural Drama," which was the first attack from the left on this system of postmodern pillarization. For Scheffer, the system was a means of *excluding* Muslims, creating a kind of segregation by which people could "coexist without interacting." Real pillarization of the sort that worked in the past rested on shared and nonnegotiable understandings of three things: language, history, and law. But Dutch society had become

too self-loathing to insist on any of them. Now people weren't even expected to learn Dutch. Scheffer complained that the Labor party (PvdA), to which he belonged, "wanted to cut the subsidies of cultural organizations that were not sufficiently concerned with ethnicity." He threw up his hands at one educator who had questioned the relevance, in a world of high immigration, of teaching Holland's history ("We're not going to bother Turkish children with the Occupation, are we?").

Dutch multiculturalism, when Bolkestein and Scheffer began to question it, was an unassailable certitude. Now it lacks a single full-throated defender. Wouter Bos, the new leader of the PvdA, many of whose members privately think the country has overreacted to the van Gogh murder, insists that "Islam is part of our country," and faults those who, "under the pretext of women's rights, try to claim that Islam doesn't belong here." He seems to want to punt the Netherlands' problems away to blue-ribbon committees and international bodies when he warns that we "underestimate the international character of the threat we're dealing with: radical political Islam."

Nonetheless, Bos, too, has been stung by recent history, particularly his party's great blunder of treating Pim Fortuyn (a former PvdA intellectual himself) as some kind of sociopath or prankster. Bos admits that in recent years, "tolerance became a pretext for not addressing problems." When asked whether his party would enter a coalition with Wilders, he does not rule it out.

The man who has been the most ardent defender of the old multiculturalist model has himself received threats from Islamists, and travels with bodyguards. Amsterdam's PvdA mayor Job Cohen was always so keen to embrace foreign cultures that Theo van Gogh (who was not above Jew-baiting) once wrote of him: "Of all the swindlers who have tried to pass off the fifth-column of goat-f—ers as some kind of an enrichment of our oh-so-marvelous multicultural society, Job Cohen is the most cunning." Questions within the Muslim community about whether they ought to be happy living under a Jewish mayor first arose under the mayoralty of Cohen's predecessor, Ed van Thijn, also Jewish, who ran the city in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Threats have been made, too, against Cohen's deputy, the Moroccan-born alderman Ahmed Aboutaleb, who has his own security detail.



AP / Fred Ernst

An unidentified demonstrator at a protest in Amsterdam honoring Theo van Gogh

Many discussions of the Netherlands suggest that the country's multicultural model is "under threat." Maybe that was true a year ago. Now it would be more accurate to say there is a society-wide consensus that it has failed. Even before he left office in 2002, PvdA premier Wim Kok had begun tightening the country's asylum laws, and under the conservative premiership of Jan Peter Balkenende, the reforms have picked up pace. One of the top priorities has been marriage laws. Several immigrant groups have an endogamy rate approaching 100 percent: Young, marriageable people return to their homelands to find a bride or groom and bring them back to Holland. Many Dutch believe the marriage laws are being abused simply to confer automatic citizenship and the right to welfare payments on as large a number of foreigners as possible. As a result, foreign spouses marrying Dutch citizens must now be 21 and speak Dutch, and their eligibility for welfare is not immediate. Education in foreign languages has been phased out, so the Dutch can concentrate on teaching their own endangered language.

MUSLIM VOLTAIRES

But with the killing of van Gogh, the Dutch immigration crisis—which, as elsewhere in Europe, is a polite way of saying its Islam crisis—has moved to a higher pitch than in any other country in the West.

Naturally, security concerns are also driving reform. Justice minister Piet Hein Donner wants tougher laws to permit holding terrorist suspects without trial. Most everyone in the Netherlands, whether they support or oppose it, believes something like the Patriot Act is coming to their country, too.

But on top of that, the Dutch public is being presented with an interpretation of their crisis that other publics in Europe are not. Namely, the view that the problem is not “radicalism” or “marginalization” or “fundamentalism” but *Islam*—that Islam and democracy don’t coexist well. There are several reasons that the debate has taken a different turn in the Netherlands, but primary among them is the presence of outspoken Muslims. Afshin Ellian is an Iranian-born legal scholar in his late 30s who is seeking to modernize Islam. He takes heart that scholars in Iran, particularly the imprisoned theorist of democracy Akbar Ghanji, are doing the same. Ellian himself is living under police protection.

When Ellian writes provocative op-eds in the country’s major journals, he gets dismissed by Muslims as a “fundamentalist of the Enlightenment.” They are not necessarily wrong. Ellian has a view of Western intellectual history that casts tolerance as the fruit of attacks on Christianity rather than of Christianity itself. He thus thinks that what Islam needs is its own Nietzsche, Voltaire, and the Marquis de Sade. Four days after the van Gogh murder, he wrote an article entitled “Make Jokes About Islam!”

The most outspoken of these foreign-born Dutch, though, is the feminist member of parliament Ayaan Hirsi Ali. The daughter of prominent Somalians, she fled the country with her family when war broke out. When she arrived in the Netherlands in the early 1990s, via Saudi Arabia, she was still wearing a veil. She soon dropped it and began proclaiming the superiority of Western values to Islamic ones. She has spoken out against female circumcision, which is clandestinely practiced in the Netherlands and Belgium. She was elected to parliament in 2003 in the wake of the killing of Pim Fortuyn. Hirsi Ali has been under constant police protection since she described the prophet Mohammed as a “perverted tyrant” in the newspaper *de Trouw* two years ago and said she no longer believed in God. She wrote the screenplay for *Submission*, the violent and semi-pornographic movie about repression of women in Islam for

which Theo van Gogh was murdered. Many of Hirsi Ali’s associates believe that she was the preferred target of the murderers, and that van Gogh was chosen only because they could not penetrate her security arrangements. They are probably right. She is in hiding and has not been seen in public since the killing.

Hirsi Ali, like Ellian, belongs to what one could call the *écrasez-l’infâme* school of reformers of Islam. She and Wilders recently cowrote a column in the *NRC Handelsblad* calling for a “liberal jihad.” Like Pim Fortuyn (who once said, “I have nothing against Moroccans; I have them in my bed all the time”), she has a tendency to taunt her political foes. And like Fortuyn, who could play up his gayness to an almost preposterous level of camp, she is aware that her outsider status makes her a natural leader for a society that fears it will die if it does not change, but would *rather* die than be accused of racism, gay-bashing, or Islamophobia.

So Hirsi Ali appears to many Muslims as the country’s premier moral monster, and to many Dutch people as something like Joan of Arc. It is her position on women’s issues that is potentially most explosive. Many European countries, notably France, are trying to recast arguments about the wearing of the Muslim headscarf as a matter of women’s rights, as if that will somehow mollify fundamentalists by moving the discussion from a religious plane to a political one. But it risks doing something different: moving the discussion from an

interpersonal level to a psychosexual one. It conveys that the West hopes to assimilate Islam by stealing its women out of the seraglio.

The Dutch minister for immigration and integration is Rita Verdonk, a woman, as it happens. In late November she went to the town of Soesterberg to speak about “Dutch values.” There she was introduced to an imam named Ahmad Salam. He refused to shake her hand.

In the hours after van Gogh’s death, Verdonk had given a speech that had drawn fire from a representative of the radical, Antwerp-based Arab-European League, who likened her to Hitler. (“All she was missing,” he said, “was the little moustache.”) But that wasn’t what bothered Salam.

“I cannot shake hands with a woman,” the imam explained.

“Well, then,” Verdonk replied, “we have plenty to talk about.” ♦

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Bush's Unheralded Health Care Agenda

It's less modest than you think

BY MERRILL MATTHEWS

President Bush has proposed what appears at first glance to be a relatively modest agenda of health care reforms. But if passed by Congress in its entirety, the administration's plan would fundamentally restructure the health care system. It would turn upside down—actually, rightside up—almost all of the current perverse economic incentives that plague the U.S. health care system.

And that's why the president will get nothing but hand-wringing, nay-saying, and eye-rolling from the liberals and elitists.

Make no mistake: The battle over health care reform is a battle of competing visions about markets, individual responsibility, and accountability. Can people make good, value-conscious decisions in the health care marketplace? Or must we all rely on someone—a bureaucrat, politician, academic, or clerk—to make health care decisions for us?

Will President Bush's ownership society extend to patients and the health care system, or will the nannies seek to undermine the president's plan and resume their drive toward government-run health care?

To understand the problems inherent in the U.S. health care system, you must first understand that it is fraught with perverse incentives. Fix the incentives and you will largely fix the system.

In a normal market, buyers and sellers enter voluntary agreements that each believes make him better off. Sellers cater to buyers—providing them with information, reasonable prices, package deals, and emphasizing quality and service. Why? Because buyers control the money that sellers want.

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Not so in health care. In the vast majority of cases, patients—the customers—don't control the money, their insurance does. As a result, health care providers—doctors, hospitals, clinics, etc.—don't know who their “customers” are. Are they the patients who use the service or the insurers, employers, or government programs that pay for the service? In short, the normal buyer and seller roles that make markets work are dysfunctional in the health care system, and no one is very happy.

The system wasn't always so convoluted. But years of ever-increasing insulation from the cost of health care and health insurance have brought us to this point.

It all started in 1943, when the IRS allowed businesses to provide health insurance as a tax-free benefit to employees. Employers were looking for a way to attract good workers during wartime while operating under government-imposed wage and price controls.

The growth of employer-provided health insurance after World War II insulated workers from the cost of both health care and health insurance. As a result, most workers have no idea how much either costs. Because someone else is paying the bill, workers want access to virtually any procedure or product available. And because employers pay for most or all of the cost of coverage, workers (who are actually paying the cost of coverage in the form of lower wages) want the most comprehensive and expensive policies.

The result is a health care entitlement mentality in the United States such that the majority of Americans seem to think they should be able to walk into any hospital, doctor's office, or pharmacy, get whatever they want or need, and pass the bill along to someone else.

Consider the four-day strike last spring by the Communications Workers of America (CWA) against SBC Communications, Inc. One of the primary issues was health care benefits. Mercer Human Resource Consult-

ing recently reported that the average per employee cost of health care rose to \$6,679 in 2004.

How much do CWA workers pay in monthly premiums at SBC? Zero. The company covers the entire cost of the premium for CWA workers and their families, and it had not passed on any of the double-digit health care cost increases over the several years preceding the strike.

So in contract negotiations, the company proposed to increase the employees' copayments from an average of about \$35 a month to about \$70 a month. Even though the average CWA worker at SBC Communications was earning more than \$60,000 a year with overtime, the union would not tolerate the extra \$35 a month.

Economics teaches that when people are insulated from the cost of something, they will use more of it. In every other sector of the economy, people bear the marginal costs of their decisions; in health care, a third party (the insurer, employer, or government) usually bears the marginal costs. That, in a nutshell, is why health care costs are growing much faster than inflation.

As health insurance premiums rise to cover exploding health care costs, many employers and individuals drop their coverage, especially in economic downturns. As a result, the number of uninsured grows.

As the number of uninsured rises, politicians, with the help of the media, see a "crisis" that must be fixed. Ironically, the fixes have almost always made matters worse, because so many politicians think the solution is to further insulate people from the cost of health care.

There is only one way to fix this system: Change the economic incentives. That is what the Bush plan does.

President Bush has identified six areas to be reformed. Each proposal is a relatively modest legislative change, but taken together they will fundamentally restructure the incentives in the system.

(1) A Tax Credit for the Uninsured — Nearly 90 percent of the population under 65 with private health insurance get it from an employer. Workers like this arrangement because the money employers spend on health insurance is tax-free to the employees. In addition, the self-employed now get a 100 percent tax deduction for what they spend on health insurance.

The journal *Health Affairs* estimates that, all together, the government "spends"—that is, forgoes—about \$188 billion each year on those tax breaks. However, workers whose employers do not provide health coverage get no tax break.

To level this playing field, President Bush has proposed a means-tested, refundable tax credit of \$1,000 per

adult and \$500 per child, for a maximum of \$3,000 per household, for anyone who buys health insurance and does not get a tax break on health insurance through his employer. The tax credit effectively lowers the cost of health insurance, making it more affordable and reducing the number of uninsured.

Critics of a capped tax credit complain that it is not enough money to help families buy a comprehensive health insurance policy, which might cost \$10,000 a year. But that is exactly the point. Most families would buy a less-expensive, high-deductible policy—which is what the self-employed usually buy. Such a policy would cover major health care expenses, while leaving smaller, routine expenses to be paid out of pocket or out of a tax-deferred account such as a Health Savings Account.

This limited tax credit gets the incentives right. Families would begin to use health insurance the way we use most other kinds of insurance: to cover large, unforeseen, catastrophic costs. Reinstilling this notion in the public mind would go a long way toward counteracting the country's health care entitlement mentality.

(2) Health Savings Accounts — President Bush has already opened the door for the expansion of consumer-driven health care by championing the new, improved Health Savings Accounts in the Medicare bill that took effect in January 2004. These HSAs are tax-free, personal accounts that are used for everyday health care expenditures and must be combined with high-deductible health insurance coverage. They replace the older, restricted Medical Savings Accounts enacted in 1996. Health Savings Accounts put health care dollars back in the hands of patients. With the consumers controlling the money and the decisions, health care providers are more alert to patients' needs.

Patients, meanwhile, get to keep any money in their HSAs that they don't spend on medical bills, and thus have a reason to be value-conscious shoppers for health care. Golden Rule, an insurance company that made a point of promoting the old MSAs and has hit the ground running with HSAs, announced recently that its customers had saved more than \$110 million in their health accounts, and that the number of applications for such accounts was up 133 percent since the new law took effect. With the administration promoting HSAs for federal employees (see www.opm.gov/hsa/), the new accounts may take off.

Now President Bush wants to expand on that reform by allowing people to get a full, above-the-line tax deduction for the cost of a high-deductible health insurance policy linked to an HSA.

(3) Tort Reform — Liability reform may top the president's health care priority list, in part because it

would have such a far-reaching impact across the economy. The president's primary proposal has been to cap noneconomic damages, which would deprive the trial bar of the multibillion-dollar revenue stream it uses to fund liberal politicians who have protected trial lawyers from tort reform.

California has had such legislation in place for 30 years, and it is well known that trial lawyers seeking to file frivolous lawsuits or game the system have to look elsewhere. Texas passed a similar reform a year ago, and the *Dallas Morning News* recently reported that "the rate of malpractice filings has decreased at least 80 percent in most major Texas counties."

(4) Buying Health Insurance Across State Lines —

If an individual living in New Jersey buys health coverage for himself, his average annual premium is about \$4,044, according to a recent survey by eHealthInsurance, an Internet health insurance site. That's the highest health insurance premium in the country, with neighboring New York running a close second at \$3,996.

The average annual premium in Iowa and Wyoming, however, is only \$1,188, the lowest in the country, and the average for the nation as a whole is \$1,812.

So why is health insurance roughly 3.5 times more expensive in New Jersey and New York than in Iowa and Wyoming? A lot of the difference has to do with regulations imposed by the states. To address this problem, the president proposes giving people the freedom to shop across state lines to find the best rates for their health insurance needs.

Legislation to that effect has been introduced by Rep. John Shadegg, a Republican from Arizona. It would increase competition and vastly expand consumers' health insurance options. People are allowed to buy virtually anything over the Internet. Why not health insurance?

(5) A Tax Break for Long-Term Care Insurance —

State budgets are strained by Medicaid costs, and one of the reasons is that so many middle- and upper-middle-income retirees who need to go to a nursing home "spend down" their assets or hide them outright so as to qualify for Medicaid.

To encourage more people to protect themselves from nursing home costs, the president supports allowing people to get a tax break for buying long-term care insurance. One way to do that is with an above-the-line deduction. In addition, Rep. Lee Terry, a Nebraska

Republican, has introduced legislation that would allow people to pay their long-term care premiums with tax-deferred funds from their IRA or 401(k) accounts. Either way, providing the tax incentives up front so that people buy the coverage will save both the federal and state governments billions of dollars in the future.

(6) Association Health Plans — Millions of Americans buy health insurance through some association with which they are affiliated. The Bush proposal would put insurance sold through associations under federal oversight. As a result, states could not control the policies and practices of the associations or mandate who and what insurance covered. States would, however, monitor financial solvency and enforce consumer protections for insurers selling through associations. The legislation has been around for several sessions but has been blocked in the Senate because of some controver-

sial provisions that would let associations self-insure—act as their own insurer—just as most large companies do.

This legislation does, however, recognize an important trend: The workforce is becoming more mobile as we move to an information economy. That trend may eventually undermine the employer-based health care system. As a result, Americans may increasingly look

for other ways to join an insurance pool, such as a trade association or an affinity group like the National Rifle Association, the Sierra Club, or a church.

If President Bush does nothing more than reverse the decades-long trend of thinking that health insurance should pay for every health care need, he will have achieved a huge victory.

As it is currently structured, the U.S. health care system is struggling because the economic incentives are distorted. Liberals think that is just fine because they believe health care cannot and should not be part of a market system.

The administration is out to prove them wrong. Each of these proposals seeks to alter the current incentives. If the president is successful, we will see dramatic changes in the health care system.

If he isn't, the health insurance market will continue to deteriorate, maybe to the point that the majority of Americans will finally throw up their hands and accept a government-run system like Canada's. And the only question then will be: Where will Canadians go to get the quality health care they need? ♦

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How Europe Sees Us

The old world confronts the new By FRED SIEGEL

Les Folies Bergère still occupies a prominent place in American memories of France, but Paris in the summertime actually hosts as many conferences on the crisis of French national identity than it does striptease shows. A French philosophy professor named Chantal Delsol was widely quoted when she recently asked: “How is it that such a brilliant nation has become such a mediocre power, so out of breath, so indebted, so closed in its own prejudices?”

Delsol went on, “To be French today is to mourn for what we no longer are.” A pervasive sense of decline in the face of globalization is at the heart of the growing virulence of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism in both France and Germany. But the sources of that decline are largely papered over in what

is being touted as a major new book on European-American relations.

Timothy Garton Ash’s *Free World: America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West*, by the author of a number of outstanding works on the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, is bound to be widely noted in policy circles. Garton Ash, by all accounts an admirable man of impeccably liberal values, bridges the transatlantic divide by splitting his time between Oxford and the Hoover Institution. He is widely respected on both sides of the Atlantic: The American edition of the book boasts blurbs by Madeleine Albright and George Shultz, while the cover of the slightly earlier British version boasted praise from no less than Vaclav Havel.

But despite the praise and promise, *Free World* has the depth and verve of a 286-page *New York Times* editorial. The book’s theme can be summarized

when the author asks why, after all, can’t Europe and America be “more sensible”? Garton Ash rightly wants us to come and reason together, but he never quite demonstrates that an absence of reasonableness is the source of European-American animosities in the first place. Who doesn’t want a calmer, more measured tone among nations? But Garton Ash systematically skirts questions of interest, power, and resentment.

He does his case no good when he obscures the underlying tensions. *Free World* cites, as an example of the good will that has been lost, the oft-quoted editorial written by Jean Colombani for *Le Monde* in the wake of the attacks of September 11: “We Are All Americans Now.” But Garton Ash seems never to have actually read it—or he would know that by its fifth paragraph the editorial had descended into the claim that America essentially deserved what

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Bettmann / CORBIS

French Communists protest American involvement in NATO in 1952.

it got for backing the mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the Soviets. Colombani ends by suggesting that it was Americans “who gave birth to this devil” of bin Laden in the first place.

As a contrast to Garton Ash’s gauzy approach, one might pick up *Our Oldest Enemy: A History of America’s Disastrous Relationship with France*, in which John Miller and Mark Molesky take a hard-edged view of French and American relations.

Franco-American ties are traditionally described as a friendship between two liberty-loving sister republics. The high points of this narrative are George Washington’s close relationship with the young Marquis de Lafayette, who fought with Americans against the British, and the French gift from Frédéric-Auguste Bartholdi of the Statue of Liberty. Bartholdi had been inspired by Edouard-René Lefebvre de Laboulaye, an ardent admirer of Abraham Lincoln—even as the French government and French public opinion had supported the Confederacy.

Both Lafayette and Laboulaye were liberals, a rare breed in France, where glory in the name of greatness has been far more important than the love of liberty. And Miller and Molesky construct a very different narrative that begins

well before the American Revolution, with the French and Indian wars. They show that in a foreshadowing of Franco-Arab hostility to the United

Free World

America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West
by Timothy Garton Ash
Random House, 286 pp., \$24.95

Our Oldest Enemy

A History of America’s Disastrous Relationship with France
by John J. Miller and Mark Molesky
Doubleday, 294 pp., \$24.95

Cowboy Capitalism

European Myths, American Reality
by Olaf Gersemann
Cato Institute, 246 pp., \$22.95

Rising from the Muck

The New Anti-Semitism in Europe
by Pierre-André Taguieff
Ivan R. Dee, 206 pp., \$26

States, America’s identity was forged in part by the war the colonists fought against the French and their Indian allies along the Western frontier. With the French using their Indian partners as “a tool of terror,” Ben Franklin warned that unless the colonists unified, the French will “presume that they may with impunity, . . . kill seize and imprison our traders, . . . murder

and scalp our farmers, with their wives and children.”

In a stormy tactical alliance, the French monarchy aided the American revolutionaries fighting for their independence against the British. But even as they worked with the Americans, the French tried to confine them to the land between the Atlantic and the Appalachians for fear that the United States might become a mighty rival. After Yorktown, the tensions between America and France meant, in the words of James McHenry, an aide to Washington, that the alliance was “terminated without leaving behind it any political principle or true permanent connection.”

By 1798 Napoleonic France and the fledgling United States were embroiled in an undeclared naval war that lasted until 1800. Long before the U.N. Oil for Food scandal enabled Saddam to buy French officials, Napoleon’s foreign minister, the oleaginous Talleyrand, was demanding a “douceur”—a sweetener, a bribe—from the Americans trying to negotiate an end to the hostilities. Talleyrand’s shakedown, known as the XYZ Affair, led to widespread anti-French sentiment and the slogan: “Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute.”

France and the United States would continue to joust over French attempts to reestablish a foothold in North America. In the 1850s, Louis Napoleon, alarmed by the growth of American strength, looked to Mexico to create what a Parisian journalist described as “a counterweight to the Republic of the United States.” A supporter of the Confederacy during the Civil War, Louis Napoleon installed a puppet Hapsburg, Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, as emperor of Mexico. France and the United States came to the brink of war; but Maximilian was brought down by Mexicans themselves, unwilling to be ruled by a European fop.

All of this history is fascinating, but by the time *Our Oldest Enemy* gets to the twentieth century, Miller and Molesky’s jaundiced view of the French gets the best of them—as, for

instance, when they argue that France and its leader during World War I, Clemenceau, bear the bulk of responsibility for World War II.

Still, *Our Oldest Enemy* is right that things are pretty bad today. The book's closing sections anticipate the Duelfer report. Charles Duelfer, who headed the Iraq Survey Group, found that tight Franco-Iraqi ties greased by the U.N.'s Oil for Bribery Program made war more likely because Saddam thought correctly that the French would do everything they could to undermine the United States. The French prime minister, responding recently to a question about French citizens taken hostage, noted that the "Iraqi insurgents are our best allies."

It is, in fact, France's lack of a liberal tradition that perpetually pits it against the United States. In another recent volume, *Cowboy Capitalism: European Myths, American Reality*, the German economic journalist Olaf Gersemann notes that "the French, Germans, and Italians got rich during times in which technological progress was relatively slow and the pressure to adjust quickly was relatively low"—while, in other words, "global competition was relatively weak." But, as in the Arab world, the economic reforms needed to respond to globalization are demonized in France as "Americanization." Despite (or perhaps because of) widespread early retirement, the thirty-five-hour work week, and a wellspring of government subsidized jobs, France's inability to reform has translated into ongoing unemployment rates of nearly 10 percent. A quarter of French youth are unemployed while roughly 40 percent of immigrant families are jobless. Yet over the last twenty years every attempt by French governments of both the left and the right to reform the system of unaffordable social benefits and rigid work rules has been met with massive street demonstrations and, in the end, defeat.

Sclerotic, unable to reform internally, a French society in decline is held together by the glue of anti-Americanism. Two additional factors add to the intensity of recent French anti-

Americanism. The first is the conscious attempt, first laid out in 1945 by Alexandre Kojève, one of the intellectual architects of the European Union, to use the Arab world to create a Eurabian "counterweight" to the United States. The second is that during the run-up to the Iraq war, France and its partner Germany, in what Garton Ash describes as Euro-Gaullism, tried to use anti-Americanism as a means of maintaining rule over a European Union expanding into Eastern Europe. France and Germany needed to control the governance of a guaranteed European market because of their declining ability to compete globally. They failed.

In *Free World*, Garton Ash devotes his closing chapters to ideas for how the United States and Europe can heal the world's social wounds. He dismisses American worries about European anti-Semitism as overheated. After all, he notes, in another piece of intellectual slovenliness, both Israelis and Palestinians kill civilians. But Europe, with its rising Muslim underclass and virulent anti-Semitism, needs to worry about healing itself.

As Barry Rubin has noted, when it comes to Judeophobia, "rather than easing the Middle East's madness," Europe has caught the disease itself. In *Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe*, philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff, a non-Jew, has written a powerful account of how European Islamophilia has generated a riptide of hatred not only on Europe's Arab streets but among left-wing and Euro-Gaullist politicians. With bin Laden being hailed as "the Che Guevara of Islam," the French guilt and humiliation left over from World War



Harry's American Bar in Paris launches a new cocktail in 1969.

II has melded imperceptibly with the Islamist attempt to paint Jews as the true Nazis. As in America during the 1960s, there has been a "heroic aestheticization" of an underclass, which coincides in this case with the attempt by the French to align themselves with third-world thugs, from Rwanda to Sudan to Vietnam, in order to increase their international leverage. But France, argues Taguieff, is playing a fool's game. He quotes a French Islamist leader: "France has more Muslims than most countries in the Arabian Peninsula, Libya, or Lebanon, . . . and [still] you don't think it's part of *dar al-Islam*."

The problems Garton Ash ignores aren't confined to France. They occur right under his nose in the pages of the *London Guardian*, a newspaper for which he writes regularly. The *Guardian* repeatedly strays across the thin line separating its love affair with Palestinian rage from anti-Semitism.

The effusions of goodthink in *Free World* float above all the disfigurement of Europe's decline, and the book's reasonableness is at odds with the realities. Reasonable fellow that he is, Garton Ash can't take either French or Islamic revanchism seriously. That's why *Free World* can't be taken seriously. ♦



Fold, Spindle, Mutilate

How the American political campaign got computerized. BY G. TRACY MEHAN III

The Democrats this year—particularly Howard Dean in the primaries and John Kerry in the general election—made great use of the Internet. Of course, both Dean and Kerry lost. But that's not the fault of their Internet efforts, and Republicans would be well served by attending to the lessons of this election.

In *America's Right Turn: How Conservatives Used New and Alternative Media to Take Power*, Richard Viguerie, the master of conservative direct-mail campaigning for over forty years, and his coauthor, David Franke, flag the Internet as the most recent and powerful of the alter-

native media. "Your modem is your equalizer, your cyber-Colt .45," they added in an October op-ed in the *Washington Post*. "You have a direct line—with no intermediaries or filters—to any publication or Web site around the world, to other citizens who share your interests and viewpoints, to government bureaucrats, to your political representatives, to the stores you want to do business with—you name it."

But Republicans have not really seized this tool—at least not as well as Howard Dean did. Managed by Joe Trippi, the Dean campaign raised over \$40 million, with 60 percent of the donations coming in at \$200 or less, while President Bush's campaign garnered only 17 percent of its donation in this range. John Kerry picked up the pace, achieving a 7-1 advantage

over the Republicans in this medium. The author of *The Almanac of American Politics*, Michael Barone, argues that the Democrats' success at garnering "huge numbers of unexpected money" from the Internet confounds the conventional wisdom that Republicans have a large advantage in fundraising.

Joe Trippi's book, *The Revolution Will Not Be Televised: Democracy, the Internet, and the Overthrow of Everything*, offers a fascinating view of the Dean campaign and its uses of the Internet. When Trippi signed on as Howard Dean's campaign manager, the campaign had seven staffers and \$100,000 in the bank. By the end of 2003, Trippi could only marvel that "we're actually on top, ahead in the polls, in the process of raking in more than \$50 million, \$15.8 million in this fundraising quarter alone—a record—most of it from small donations of \$100 or less. And whose fundraising record are we beating? Our own! From the quarter before. We have an army of almost 600,000 fired-up supporters, not just a bunch of chicken-dinner donors, but activists, *believers*, people who have never been politically involved before and who are now living and breathing this campaign."

Trippi is, at heart, an idealist who decries the loss of community and democratic values in American society, citing statistics on the loss of social capital and the decline of political participation from Robert Putnam's book, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. Trippi also serves up a pretty good rant on the corrosive effect of television on politics and culture that will warm the heart of any Burkean conservative. Of course, he's also a revolutionary. Viewing the Internet as at last a "dominant technology"—with 75 percent of Americans on the Internet—Trippi believes that it is "the last hope for democracy." It is the means by which citizens can purge politics of money, special interests, and corruption through technological empowerment.

Trippi places the Dean campaign's use of the Internet in a line with such campaign innovations as Jerry Brown's toll-free telephone number, Ross

America's Right Turn *How Conservatives Used New and Alternative Media to Take Power*

by Richard Viguerie
and David Franke
Bonus, 384 pp., \$26.95

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised *Democracy, the Internet, and the Overthrow of Everything*

by Joe Trippi
Regan, 272 pp., \$26.95

G. Tracy Mehan III was assistant administrator for water at the EPA. He is presently a consultant in Arlington, Virginia.

Perot's fiscal and trade populism, and John McCain's insurgency of 2000, "the first national campaign to attempt to make use of the Internet." McCain pulled 40,000 people into his campaign, but the technology was not yet where it needed to be.

Trippi's account of the transformational role of the Internet in national politics, despite the defeats of Dean and Kerry, is persuasive. He recounts the attempt to mobilize previously unorganized, unconnected supporters through a website called *Meetup.com*, which Trippi linked to the Dean website on his very first day on the job. Howard Dean told Trippi that they had to decentralize the campaign because they would never have the money to organize it in the traditional way.

Meetup.com is a site where people interested in certain topics—typically something like stamps, Irish setters, or Star Trek—are matched up for get-togethers (usually at a Starbucks, for smaller gatherings). Trippi had stumbled across this site while reading a blogger who mentioned that Dean supporters were using the site to arrange meetings in several cities. For Trippi, "it was exactly the democratic vision of the Internet that I had always believed in, using technology as a way for people of similar interests, passions, and causes to find each other and *instantly* form into communities—tiny little Iowa caucuses made up of science fiction fans and curling enthusiasts and knitters."

A small number of Dean supporters, only 432 across the nation, had already signed up. But after the Dean campaign posted the link on its own website, 2,700 people immediately enlisted for Dean. Trippi negotiated an agreement with *Meetup.com* to do ongoing organizing of Dean supporters for a rock-bottom price of \$2,500—which yielded 190,000 new Dean members. Almost eight hundred Deaniacs showed up for one meeting in Manhattan at which the candidate made an appearance. This became a regular feature of Dean's schedule throughout the campaign. One jealous adviser to a Dean rival sniffed, "Some of these

Meetup events look like the bar scene from *Star Wars*."

Despite the campaign's success with the Internet, Trippi's candidate appears to have cooled on his campaign manager. Dean seems to have viewed Trippi as a bit mercurial, too much of an enthusiast for the Internet, carrying the decentralizing theme a bit too far. The downward slope of the relationship is epitomized by Dean's failure to inform Trippi of the endorsement of Dean by Al Gore. Trippi heard about it only when everyone else did.

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised is a traditional campaign narrative, a brief for the potential of the Internet in

politics, and a broader argument for the transforming impact of new technologies on society in general and business in particular. Despite its flip, often irreverent style and its overuse of four-letter words, it is, on balance, a substantive volume worth the time of serious readers.

Of course, Trippi envisions a liberal utopia driven by this new technology. But despite his view that the Republican party is a command-and-control party, overly wedded to top-down management, the history of the GOP since 1964 suggests otherwise. At least, one hopes so, for the influence of the Internet on elections is here to stay. ♦



Spy vs. Spy

There's a lesson to be learned, still, from the great Cold War spy George Kisevalter. BY CLAIRE BERLINSKI

CIA *SpyMaster*, Clarence Ashley's biography of George Kisevalter, the CIA's most decorated case officer, is apt to suffuse the old Cold Warriors at the Agency with the nostalgia for the glory days, when the CIA could do no wrong—or at least could do something right.

Born in 1910 in St. Petersburg to the grandson of a Russian finance minister, Kisevalter departed Russia as a child when his father, a munitions expert, was dispatched to the United States in 1916 to procure weapons for the tsar's army. When the revolution came, the Kisevalter family threw its support behind the Whites. All but one member of the family in Russia were annihilated. Kisevalter's immediate family found itself stranded in New York. Growing

up amid Russian refugees, Kisevalter remained fluent in his first language. After studying engineering at Dartmouth, he competently discharged his duties as an intelligence officer during the war. A brief career in alfalfa farming followed, after which he accepted, in late 1951, a position as branch chief in the Soviet Russia division of the newly formed CIA.

At the end of 1952, with the Cold War at its height, the United States was still ignorant of even the most basic information about Soviet plans and military capacity.

And then a miracle occurred. In 1953, a Soviet military intelligence officer stationed in Vienna named Pyotr Popov volunteered to spy for the United States. Kisevalter was elected to handle the case. (Living under an assumed name in Vienna, he took the principle of the double life to heart, maintaining an American wife in Salzburg and an Austrian mistress.)

CIA SpyMaster
Kisevalter, the Agency's Top Case Officer, Who Handled Penkovsky and Popov
by Clarence Ashley
Pelican, 288 pp., \$24.95

Claire Berlinski's novel Loose Lips, set in the CIA, was published by Random House in 2003. A sequel, Lion Eyes, is forthcoming.



Penkovsky, center, and Kisevalter, right, in 1961.

Over the next five years, the spy provided Kisevalter with detailed information about Soviet military capabilities and plans. Popov was arrested in 1959, the victim of an American trade-craft error: As the defector Nosenko later revealed, a diplomat in Moscow, mailing Popov a letter, had failed to spot a Soviet surveillant, and the letter was retrieved from the mailbox and decoded. Hauntingly, Popov was able to pass one last message to his handlers. The KGB, intending to use him as a double agent, had sent him to a meeting with CIA case officer Russell Langelle in Moscow. In full view of KGB surveillance, Popov shook Langelle's hand and in the process surreptitiously slipped him a note, rolled into a cylinder the size of a cigarette, revealing that he had passed under hostile control.

He was a hero to the end: The famous cylinder message provided a detailed account of the KGB's understanding of Popov's cooperation with the Americans and their plans to exploit him in the future. He had painstakingly written the message while in prison, over a period of months, concealing it under a bandage he had contrived to obtain by cutting his finger. Kisevalter was devastated by the note's heartbreaking last words: "Could you not ask your kind President Eisenhower to see if he might cause restitution to be made for my family and my life?" Shortly after, Lan-

gelle was expelled from Russia and Popov sent to a Soviet firing squad.

In 1961, another miracle occurred. A GRU colonel named Oleg Penkovsky, an even more senior military intelligence officer, approached a group of visiting American students in Moscow and urged them to deliver a letter to the American embassy. "I offer my services to you," Penkovsky wrote, "and I have some most significant facts to share." Again, Kisevalter was dispatched to handle the case. The information Penkovsky provided over the next year included the manuals on the SS-4, the missiles deployed by the Soviet Union in Cuba in 1962, and the revelation that the Soviet Union did not yet possess operational ICBMs. By opening a window into the Kremlin's internal politics, Penkovsky drew the United States back from the brink of nuclear war during the Berlin and Cuban crises. For this, Kisevalter became a CIA legend. Penkovsky, however, was undone by an astute KGB surveillance team and executed by firing squad.

In 1962, Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet counterintelligence officer who had squandered KGB funds on a drinking spree (and a thieving hooker, although Ashley chastely refrains from mentioning this detail), volunteered his services to the CIA in Geneva. He defected to the United States in 1964. The Agency was not so sure this was a miracle. Nosenko had participated in

the KGB's internal investigation of the Kennedy assassination, which proclaimed the KGB innocent of any involvement. Fearing the defector to be a provocation, senior officials, under the direction of the paranoid James Jesus Angleton, incarcerated him for five years under conditions so cruel that his security guard, describing the situation to Kisevalter, vomited with guilt.

Kisevalter had handled Nosenko and believed him legitimate. But he did nothing. "He was just not the kind of guy," writes Ashley, "who would burst into the chief's office and say, 'You are making a terrible mistake and destroying one of the finest agents and operational sources that we have ever had,' although it would most assuredly have been his sentiment. George actually had a reverence for legitimate authority." *CIA SpyMaster* venerates Kisevalter for his character and his heroism, but this painful episode is hardly evidence for either. Nosenko was ultimately released, though never exonerated, and confusion about his case remains.

Clarence Ashley assessed Soviet strategic missile capabilities and evaluated the CIA's intelligence-collection systems for seven years before leaving to pursue a career in commercial real estate in northern Virginia. Although Kisevalter and Ashley worked for the CIA at the same time, their paths never crossed. Following mandatory retirement, however, Kisevalter too enjoyed a desultory second career in real estate at Ashley's firm, where he shambled in daily for his morning game of pinochle. There Ashley and Kisevalter became friends and remained close for the next twenty-four years. Ashley's biography draws upon newly released CIA files, as well as interviews with Kisevalter's colleagues and KGB defectors. But the book is essentially a transcribed oral history based on Ashley's conversations with Kisevalter shortly before the ancient spymaster's death in 1997.

This is Ashley's first book, and it is a great shame he did not receive better editorial guidance. The book begins

with an endless, clumsy scene at Kisevalter's funeral, at which his family and colleagues say what everyone says at a funeral: The deceased was a terrific guy. He will be missed. Ashley's characterization continues in this vein throughout: Kisevalter was "a fascinating individual," "quite an individual," "a unique individual." The author's affection for Kisevalter is evident and touching. But that affection has hampered his literary judgment; he is unable to discern that many of the details of Kisevalter's life, as well as many of his opinions, are simply not that interesting.

How on earth, for example, did the long discussion of Kisevalter's former career in alfalfa farming slip by a professional editor and into a book about the great dramas and dangers of Cold War espionage? For those whose curiosity about alfalfa remains unsated by page after page in the main text, there is much to ponder in the footnotes, where no detail of the process by which the animal liver converts the carotene hydrocarbon to vitamin A remains unexplored. One senses that in many places—most, in fact—Ashley has simply transcribed directly from his interview notes with Kisevalter or from the declassified case files. The standard of prose in CIA case files is nothing to which any writer should aspire.

Nonetheless, for the determined reader, there are interesting stories sandwiched between the alfalfa. We learn that the KGB conducted surveillance of American embassy personnel in Moscow by dusting the soles of their targets' shoes with the ultra-secret "Neptune 80," an elixir extracted from female dogs in heat, then tracking the diplomats at a distance with the dogs' anxious mates.

Kisevalter's recollection of the shameful, bungled handling of the Alexander Cherepanov case is particularly noteworthy: Cherepanov, a KGB counterintelligence officer, attempted in 1963 to offer his services to the CIA by thrusting a package of documents upon a pair of unsuspecting American tourists, pleading with them to take the parcel to the American Embassy. They



Allen Dulles, right, presents the Distinguished Intelligence Medal to Kisevalter in 1959.

did so, but having received the documents, the chargé d'affaires, fearing a flap, insisted—over the CIA station chief's violent objections—upon returning the documents to the Soviets, thus fingering Cherepanov. He tried to escape. The KGB hunted him down and executed him.

There are a number of important lessons in these stories, though Ashley fails to draw them. Foremost among them is that Popov, Penkovsky, Nosenko, and the tragic Cherepanov volunteered to spy for America. They were not recruited. Indeed, they volunteered with such eagerness that Penkovsky appeared to be prepared to work for *any* Westerner, including the Canadian embassy's commercial counselor.

What this means is that the CIA's recruitment-driven model of espionage is fundamentally flawed. Yet the model continues to drive internal promotions in the Agency, with destructive consequences for the war on Islamic radicalism. Thousands of useless, unmotivated agents are recruited abroad simply to add numbers to case officers' annual performance reports—but officers are given no incentive to cultivate the far more useful skills that would enable them to handle volunteers in the deft manner of a Kisevalter.

Kisevalter's success was in large measure due to his fluency in Russian and his knowledge of Russian culture and history. In its concern to defend itself against foreign penetration, the

Agency is loath to hire operatives with connections to foreign countries. The modern equivalent of a Kisevalter—a man born in Afghanistan or Iraq, a native speaker of Pashto or Arabic with deep ties to his country of birth—would in all likelihood not be given security clearance. Accordingly, the Agency has very few operatives from Middle Eastern backgrounds and almost no speakers of the languages necessary for the conduct of modern intelligence. This is a scandal.

CIA SpyMaster, with its description of the long tradition of bureaucratic torpor within the CIA, offers another inadvertent insight into the Agency's recent intelligence failures. When Penkovsky volunteered, he proposed to check a signal site, three days later, for an American counter-sign. "Of course," writes Ashley, "he did not know how the Agency bureaucracy worked. The people there just could not respond in three days. One could not even be expected to do traces in three days. One doesn't do anything in three days in a bureaucracy." During the Cold War, this was a tolerable weakness. In an era where rapid and accurate name traces mean the difference between granting and denying entry visas to terrorists, this kind of inept sluggishness is a catastrophic liability.

Until the intelligence community learns the lessons of the cases Kisevalter handled, there will be no successes comparable to the Popov and Penkovsky cases—and there will be many more failures. ♦

The Standard Reader



“Free Gifts!”

Books in Brief



***The Democratic Century* by Seymour Martin Lipset and Jason M. Lakin (University of Oklahoma Press, 478 pp., \$34.95).** Over the past half

century, the political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset has produced a prodigious body of work—both authoritative and highly readable—on a mind-boggling array of subjects, from Canadian socialism to American exceptionalism, from the internal politics of universities and trade unions to the history of extremist movements in the United States. Now the University of Oklahoma Press has published an expanded version of three lectures Lipset delivered in the mid-1990s that synthesize many of the themes with which he has dealt during his career.

Among Lipset's accomplishments is the success he had as a mentor to several generations of scholars. This volume owes its appearance to the faithful work of a student, Jason Lakin, who completed the text following a debilitating stroke that Lipset suffered in 2001.

The book is divided into two sections. The first returns to the comparative political analysis Lipset first developed in the 1950s and brought together in his seminal volumes *Political Man*

and *The First New Nation*. The analysis has even more resonance today in light of the “third wave” of democracy that began over a decade after *The First New Nation* was published. In this first section, Lipset examines the ways in which democratic countries differ from nondemocratic ones: how institutions that constitute democracy interact with one another, how political parties develop in new democracies, why the quality of civil societies matters more than the mere existence of civic associations, the centrality of legitimacy to the success of democratic regimes, and the relation between democracy and capitalism.

Lipset has long been interested in the linkage between cultural factors and the quality of democracy. *The Democratic Century* demonstrates that cultures incompatible with democratic values—such as tolerance of political opposition and acceptance of a secular sphere—must find a way to incorporate those principles if they are to democratize. Still, the book concludes, “in the long run, most cultures appear to have the potential to converge with democratic culture.”

The second part of *The Democratic Century* applies Lipset's analytical framework to Latin America, following his pathbreaking comparative

analysis of the United States and Canada, which showed how two countries on the same continent could have such different social and political systems. The strong emphasis is upon historical factors, including not only the differing patterns of colonization and struggles for independence but also on the values and institutions that characterized the colonizing countries. In contrast to Britain's relatively laissez-faire approach to its colonies, Spain created tight regulations that promoted unequal distribution of property and a legacy of statist economic control. Such historical factors interact with cultural, structural, and institutional ones to explain why (with a few exceptions: Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay) the countries of the region have experienced repeated cycles of democratization and breakdown.

Is *The Democratic Century* optimistic about the world's prospects for democracy? On the one hand, a global consensus has developed around the need for market-oriented strategies. On the other, the steady growth of civil society has not been matched by strong and durable political parties. Cultural factors also present a mixed picture. Still, we can all be grateful to Lipset and Lakin for improving our understanding of the challenges that lie ahead.

—David Lowe



***The Long Goodbye* by Patti Davis (Knopf, 199 pp., \$20).**

When Patti Davis was a teenager, she danced on her father's feet at a debutante ball. “I didn't know how to waltz,” she writes, and so her father, Ronald Reagan, told her to stand on his feet. “It felt like floating,” Davis wistfully recalls. “My father was tall and strong, and he glided around the floor with me balanced on his feet as if I weighed no more than a pair of laces.”

But in the summer of 1996, Davis would be the one to take her father—then suffering from Alzheimer's—by the hand. *The Long Goodbye* is a compi-

lation of heartfelt journal entries from April 1995 to June 5, 2004, the day she witnessed her father succumb. Davis's relations with her famous parents weren't always happy. She railed against the Vietnam war and, later, against her father's policies as president. Then, at age forty-two, Davis made peace with her family. "I used to be so angry . . . and I didn't even know why half the time. I missed so much, let so many days roll by, not realizing how fast they were going, and now they've come back to ache inside me."

For Davis, it's the little things that make a father great in his children's eyes. Whether he was teaching her to bodysurf or ride a horse, or helping her with a science project, Reagan always had a life lesson to impart to his youngest daughter.

—Erin Montgomery



***Do-Gooders: How Liberals Hurt Those They Claim to Help (And the Rest of Us)* by Mona Charen (Sentinel, 288 pp., \$25.95).** Just as President Bush has vowed to rid the world of evildoers, Mona Charen is ready to take on the do-gooders. Following up on her bestselling *Useful Idiots*, Charen seeks to debunk liberal discourse and unearth the facts that never make the *New York Times*. To carry out this task, she becomes a genealogist of how liberal discourse emerged in "the Great Disruption of the 1960s" and now distorts our thinking and public policies.

For Charen, the "do-gooder Don Quixotes" inaugurated a "compassion binge" and "comfortable morality play" in which society, an empty abstraction, is always blamed and individuals are always exonerated. If only people could be freed from the chains of society, peace and goodwill would reign. Or so they claim.

Of course, this utopian vision hasn't turned out so peachy; nearly everyone liberals reached out to help is now worse off. Charen rightly asks what is behind the liberal project. Far from

compassion, it seems a "paternalistic nihilism," a term Cornel West coined to name the outlook of the liberal elite who "become ineffectual by having bought into the corruptions of a power-hungry system." Real compassion encourages responsibility, as conservatives insist.

The strength of Charen's *Do-Gooders* is also its limitation. The book amasses empirical evidence to buttress the author's genealogy of liberal discourse. But facts need interpretive adornment. Charen's "chronicle of failure" invites in addition a robust argument about human nature and politics.

—Christopher Benson



***A Mighty Fortress: A New History of the German People* by Steven Ozment (Harper-Collins, 416 pp., \$26.95).**

German history, the whole enchilada, in four hundred pages, from an obscure tribe called the Cimbric in 113 B.C. to Gerhard Schröder, the Iraq war, and Berlin's attempt to reform the German welfare state.

Steven Ozment, a professor of ancient and modern history at Harvard University, does not write like a professor. Ozment is actually a pleasure to read. But brace yourself. This is a dizzyingly fast excursion at times. Nietzsche gets a page and a half; Goethe three. You are in and out of Weimar in a heartbeat.

Moreover, Ozment's approach to his subject will not be to everyone's liking. The author concedes at the outset of the book that he is not a fan of the "gloomy moralizing" school of World War II historians, who generally sought to "muckrake and accuse." Ozment follows instead the path of the late German historian Thomas Nipperdey, who believed that history ought to be written from past to present, not the other way around.

In other words, Ozment does not find it very productive to treat history

as a hunting ground for clues that help us explain the barbarism of Germans during the Nazi years. Likewise, Ozment is not at all taken by the idea, as he puts it, that the history of modern Germany is to be seen as "a progressive genetic disease."

Fair enough. And Ozment is not out to whitewash German history either. He admits the anti-Semitism of Martin Luther and Otto von Bismarck. He writes of how Nazi propaganda captured the imagination not only of beer-halls but also of boardrooms and universities. He concedes readily that the plotters who tried to kill Hitler in 1944 were hardly liberal democrats.

The full history of the Germans is remarkable and rich. Try to imagine the development of music these last centuries without Bach, Händel, Haydn, Beethoven, Schubert, Brahms, Bruckner, Wagner, and Schönberg. It must be truly a curse to be German and know that your entire history is often reduced to the Holocaust. It is also surely a good thing that Ozment brings passion and genuine affection to his subject.

Nevertheless, you have to wonder about some of Ozment's conclusions. A successful, problem-solving Weimar Republic, he writes, would have "mesmerized far more Germans than all the ranting speeches of Hitler." Maybe. Schröder's refusal to rubber-stamp American foreign policy in Iraq was a "proper action for a normal nation." This is not the spin I would have given. Ozment praises novelist Günter Grass as an idealist. I always thought of Grass as a cultural pessimist and cranky cynic who dislikes American power and hates the idea of fellow Germans' choosing unification.

In a concluding passage Ozment gives postwar Germans a thumbs-up for "refusing on moral grounds to let [Germany] become a riven land of haves and have-nots like the United States." It is good to know that some things at Harvard never change.

—Jeffrey Gedmin

SEARCH RESULTS FOR: Kerik Nomin+ Page A1

☒ LIST OLDEST FIRST

☐ LIST RECENT FIRST

- 1: Boston Globe, November 28, 2007, Page A1, 2,388 words
Three Years After: Kerik's Nomination Sheds Harsh Light on White House Vetting Process
Although President Bush's Cabinet appointments for the second term of his administration were confirmed almost three years ago, the nomination and withdrawal of Bernard Kerik as Director of Homeland Security in December 2004 continues to illuminate what was an imperfect selection process in the White House. The Kerik scandal, a paralyzing embarrassment for the Bush administration that historians seem likely to debate for many years, has left the....
- 2: Washington Post, December 3, 2007, Page A1, 920 words
Kerik Linked By Friend's Uncle to 1938 Anschluss: Childhood Playmate Had Austrian Uncle. In another blow to the Bush administration, a childhood friend of disgraced former police commissioner and former Homeland Security Department nominee Bernard Kerik has admitted to having an uncle who immigrated to the United States from Austria, a country that experienced annexation by Nazi Germany in 1938. The nomination of Bernard Kerik in late 2004, widely viewed as a devastating, unbelievable mistake by the Bush administration,....
- 3: Boston Globe, September 18, 2008, Page A1, 2,388 words
Survey Suggests that Majority of Americans Still "Somewhat Able" to Recall Nomination of Bernard Kerik. In a Times/Gallup survey released today, 55% of Americans polled about former Homeland Security nominee Bernard Kerik said that they might have at least some memory of Kerik and his nomination. Such figures are unlikely to please the Bush administration, which has attempted ever since 2004 to recover from the unimaginable embarrassment of Kerik's....
- 4: New York Times, March 6, 2009, Page A1, 1,936 words
The Nomination and Withdrawal of Bernard Kerik: A Telephone Rings (Part 4 in a series of 20 stories.) When the alarm clock went off that Tuesday morning, the last thing that Muffy Turlington expected was to hear what sounded like a ring in the neighboring apartment. Turlington, who lives on a floor above an apartment once visited by former police commissioner Bernard Kerik, attempted to listen more closely before deciding, for now, to go and make coffee instead. Although Turlington could provide no further information to reporters on anything having to do with the Kerik confirmation, Turlington, a longtime New Yorker, spoke....
- 5: Boston Globe, August 23, 2011, Page A1, 1,340 words.
As First-Grader, Kerik Resisted Instructions to Share. Among the scruffy hallways of Paterson's George Washington Elementary School, the ghost of Bernard Kerik lingers. Teachers and friends of Bernard Kerik, former New York police commissioner, say they were unsurprised to learn over five years ago that Kerik was withdrawing himself as a candidate for the Department of Homeland Security. When it came to sharing, "Bernie was resistant," said former first-....
- 6: Akutan News, October 11, 2014, Page A1, 582 words
Kerik Diverting Seal Profits to Help Fund Love Igloo. Aleutian papers today reported that former New York police commissioner Bernard Kerik, nominated by former President George W. Bush for the position of Homeland Security Director ten years ago, has been diverting profits from a local seal hunting venture to help construct a "Love Igloo." In the story of Kerik, who now resides on a lesser island in the Aleutian chain, revelations have continued to unfold in the wake of what was widely viewed as a devastating, world-historical misstep by the Bush....